KNITTING OVER NEW PERSPECTIVES: A CONSTRUCTIVIST STUDY ON CHINESE NATIONAL IDENTITY AFTER THE 1978 REFORMS

PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD JAVERIANA
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To my mother, my father and my brother,
for this time of our lives has not been an easy one;
to my closest friends,
for they keep me looking forward to the future;
to my thesis director,
who understood and supported me until the very last minute;
and to myself,
for I am my biggest hindrance, but my major and most important advocate.

From now on and always, the show must go on.
CONTENTS

Preface

Introduction

1.1. General Objective
1.2. Specific Objectives
1.3. Methodology

Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework

2.1. What is identity? An approach from constructivism
2.2. What are we talking about when we talk about National Identity?
   2.2.1. International Roles
   2.2.2. Affiliations
   2.2.3. Bodies
   2.2.4. Autobiographies
2.3. Worlding as an alternative perspective on different ontological frameworks
2.4. On deconstruction
2.5. Knitting over unexplored perspectives

Chapter 2: Socio political change in China vis-á-vis the effects of opening and reform

3.1. Winds of change
3.2. The early impacts of the ‘open doors’ policy
3.3. The Confucianism fallacy

Chapter 3: Chinese National Identity after the reform

4.1. Why the Constitution
4.2. Changes
   4.2.1. First Period: 1983-1993
   4.2.2. Second Period: 1994-1999
   4.2.3. Third Period: 2000-2004
   4.2.4. Fourth Period: 2005-2018
4.3. What changed?
4.4. I Love Dollars

Conclusions
References
Annexes
When I first heard in a lecture about the concept ‘national identity’ I just assumed what it was, as the rest of the classroom did. No one asked about it and neither the professor saw the possibility to explain what it was due to a lack of interest around it. Then, it didn’t seem to me like a big issue. However, as time passed I started to associate it with a sense of pride around patriotic symbols, like it could be the ‘sombrero vueltiao’ or the football team in Colombia. I was frustrated with the idea of my sense of national identity spinning around a sport I didn’t even liked, or being represented through a traditional hat of the of the hot Colombian coast when I was born in the cold central capital of the country. Believe me, I was not disappointed by the hat, which is really beautiful and I myself see as a symbol of Colombia, but for the idea that something that I didn’t get to know until I visited the north western part of the country, became that symbol before things I felt cultural and geographically closer with.

After getting to feel (or think) I was not patriotic enough according to those symbols that I didn’t identified with, I realized I didn’t even know what “national identity” was. And to my surprise, not many people did.

It became a huge mystery that I felt I needed to solve in order to be at peace with my sense of being and feeling Colombian.

Now, thanks to this investigation, I have come to understand national identity is not as patriotic and beautiful as it sounds. But is rather a much more interesting and important matter, one that should be granted more attention and spotlight in the study of International Relations.
1. INTRODUCTION

Even if national identity came to be along with modern nation state, it did not become a big issue until constructivism started gaining reach in the field of International Relations in the late 80’s (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010). Even though, the value of perception and group identity has been widely recognized before in foreign policy making, as William Bloom’s Book ‘Personal identity, national identity and international relations’ (1993) shows. Besides that, the concept used to be largely approached through and associated to Nationalism (Smith, 1997), which can wrongly constrain relations between nations as well as within the nation. “The nation state's ascribed character meant that national identity appeared only with the emergence of the modern European nation state, often in association with such concepts as 'nationalism,' ‘national self-determination,' and ‘state community’” (Wang & He, 2014, p.140). However, thanks to constructivism, national identity has been recognized as one of the many forms of collective identity, specifically nation state identity.

Now, the conceptualization of national identity is mainly associated with western academics and theories around modern state. This phenomenon can be explained in Political Science because the biggest expositors who first approached the matter were classics such as Karl Marx, Max Weber, Thomas Hobbes, and so on, and nowadays, Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson or Anthony D. Smith.

At this point, only political science academics have been addressed since International Relations (IR) did not born as an independent field from it, and in consequence took a big theoretical kick-off from what first political scientist theorized about states. As it began to develop independently, it never managed to break from that clout. According to Tickner & Blaney (2017) this has constrained

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1 At the time he wrote this book (1990), he only recognized three major areas of argument: 1) Historians/classicist versus behavioralist/scientist; 2) Realist versus idealist; 3) State-centrist versus structuralist/ Marxist (1993, p.105). Here however, Bloom highlights the importance of national identity (principally as a phycological response) to the process of nation building, and the conceptualization and theoretical framework for foreign policy analysis.
the boundaries of the discipline and pushed over limitations in conceptual and categorical toolboxes.

What's more, the discipline lacks the ability to construct and conceptualize “new worlds” and to recognize other ontologies. Hence, it does not leave room to create “distinctive ways of knowing grounded in diverse lived experiences or ways of being in the world” (Tickner & Blaney, 2017, pg.294). As a result, there are several coloniality logics that keep reproducing. How can an investigation on national identities become ‘real’ without breaking this theoretical limitations? And how can they be broken without new academics taking over this problem by recognizing it, building over it, and others supporting those initiatives?

For instance, China’s academy on national identity faced a similar problem. During the post-Maoist era the term "nationalism" began to be more openly used within Chinese official statements and media. Carlson (2011) explains that this environment promoted the work of academics who deepened the study on the role of nationalism in the emergence of the Chinese Communist Party (PCC) during the 1930s and 1940s. From the late 1990s until the beginning of the last decade, those works were overtaken by many studies that sought to describe and explain what appeared to be a pronounced increase in nationalist sentiment in China. Thanks to the good reception that these studies had, the issue of nationalism quickly came to dominate on the consideration of identity politics in China (ibid.). Consequently, during this period references to national identity were absent and replaced by dozens of mentions of nationalism (ibid.).

“[…] it was only after the demise of the Soviet Union in the 1990s that Chinese scholars began to take an interest in national identity with a view to exploring ways of nation-building in their multi-ethnic country. In the new century, discussions of national identity have often been closely associated with successive waves of globalization” (Wang & He, 2014, p.140).

According to Carlton (2010), despite the importance of this tendency to improve the understanding of contemporary Chinese politics, through the demonstration of the
significance of nationalist rhetoric in strengthening the legitimacy of the regime, this analysis has had a distorting effect on the way in which the political identity in China is studied. "This criticism stems from the claim that giving nationalism an unparalleled place in the study of political identities within China, creates intellectual girdles that artificially narrow what scholars examine and how they frame their work" (ibid., p.225). In this way, it can be said that there is a research vacuum in terms of Chinese national identity, which has been extended to the present where is recognized as an important tool of unification in a country as big, multicultural and multiethnic as China (Wang & He, 2014. Kelly, 2006).

In that sense, taking into account the turmoil that characterized the first decades of the history of the People’s Republic of China, and the cultural, economic and ideological shift produced by the reforms and opening driven by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, an incognito surge: Which has been the Chinese national identity after the introduction of the market economy? And therefore, how and to what extend have the Chinese national identity changed for the government and the people after the reforms to this day?

This questions will be answered trough an exploratory investigation which aims to articulate different theoretical and historical nodes that may seem at first disjointed. This effort comes from intellectual curiosity and an attempt to give insights to academic nuances commonly neglected in IR. In that sense, the objectives are the following:

1.1. General Objective

To explore which, how and to what extent the Chinese national identity has changed for the government and the people after the reforms of Deng Xiaoping to this day.

1.2. Specific Objectives

1. To stablish a definition of national identity and its dimensions of analysis.
2. To identify and analyze the behavior of those dimensions throughout the period of 1980’s to 2018 in China, for the government and for the people.

1.3. Methodology

This dissertation is a qualitative investigations of exploratory nature. In order to attempt to comprehend the changes of the Chinese National Identity, the methodology tools will gravitate around literature review (in order to gather information around National Identity and which can be its dimensions of analysis), documentary research (focusing on the analysis of the Chinese 1982 constitution amendments in the light of the dimensions established with the literature review), and literature works analysis through a documentary research (this one focused on documents which explain the context in which the literary works to be analyzed came to be). The principal literature work is *I Love Dollars and Other Stories of China* by Zhu Wen.

Also, part of the methodology will gravitate around Jacques Derrida’s approach to deconstruction theory. In the second phase of this investigation, a deconstruction approach will be made to the Constitution in order to establish dichotomies that could help give a broader insight to National Identity in China.

Additionally, a warning about deconstruction as a methodology should be made: it is not one in the sense of applicability of rules; it is certainly not a universal technique with norms and processes. Rather, it is a tool for critic and interpretative textual practices. In that sense, deconstruction in IR is primarily a fashionable way of labeling the intention to criticize an international phenomena or theory (Filary, 2014). In that sense, a complete deconstruction will not take place in this investigation, but just an approximation to a fundamental part of it, be it dichotomy theory.

The selection of the literary work obeys to the historical period it refers to. *I love dollars* was written in 1995 after the turmoil of the Tiananmen movement and violent outbreak, and the decadency of the intellectual outburst that was lived in the
80’s. Here, the positive economic consequences of the 1978 reforms were starting to notice, after the pragmatic doctrine injection of Deng Xiaoping in 1992 that put an end to the profound intellectual and ideological debates. Ideology started to lose scope first to a short resurgence of political orthodoxy, and then to capitalism and consumerism.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Throughout the whole paper the concept of identity is going to be present. Therefore, its theoretical linkage with International Relations will be exposed below, as an analysis unit by its own, and later as National Identity. After an insight on a need to change traditional approximations to ways of understanding and being in the world (world ontologies), so as to broaden the methodological framework, a brief insight on Derrida’s thoughts about deconstruction will be extended.

2.1. What is identity? An approach from constructivism

To better understand the meaning and relevance of identity to IR nowadays, a short recount about the discipline’s theoretical history is necessary.

First, the context in which the discipline started to be structured was one of wars and profound conflict at the beginnings of the XX century, specifically after the First World War (Sánchez, 2012). It did not emerge as the result of a natural process of theoretical development, but as an struggle to explain, comprehend and avoid international conflicts (ibid.). Quickly, an ontological debate started in the former incipient discipline, as the “first great debate of IR”, between Liberalism and Realism. Here, the early approximations to unit analysis conceptualization started, with “power” for realists and “cooperation” for liberals (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010).

Moving forward, a revision on liberalism and realism (which brought up neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism) led to the introduction of new themes aside from security, like development, trade, and some hints of unexplored concepts such as culture and identity. However, further debates came to be, as neo-neo theories
came short when dealing with certain topics like identity, culture, ethics, etc. (Sánchez, 2012).

As a response to this shortcoming, the reflexive debates emerged, in opposition to materialist and structuralist approaches. Theories, such as postmodernism, critical theory, postcolonialism, normative theory, feminism, green theories, and so on, appeared (ibid.). This, is the context where constructivism came to be, around the mid 80’s.

Now, constructivism is in no way a homogeneous approach, neither in social Sciences nor in IR, be it theoretically or methodologically. Even though, it is not a mistake to assume that all viewpoints take identity as one of the central analysis units. This, since “the focus of [...] constructivism is on human awareness or consciousness and its place in the world affairs” (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, p.160). Hence, it moves away from materialistic approaches, like the ones shown above, that place States interaction and behavior as the result of the distribution of material power (ibid.).

In that sense, constructivism states that the [international] politics world exist as a reality derived from human consciousness and the collective understandings of societies (not as a physical entity or material object), and therefore is biased by its ideas and beliefs (ibid.). On this extent, International society exist only as a dialogue and/or struggle of ideas, a purely intellectual and ideational creation, and not as material forces. Ergo, “if the thoughts and ideas that enter into the existence of IR change, then the system itself will change (...), [since] this system consist in thoughts and ideas” (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, p.160). And if ideas come from individuals, then, what makes people have this beliefs and ways of interaction? The answer for constructivism: identity.

For people, identity does not come as something given, but as the result of social interaction and self-construction (for constructivist with an emphasis on the former) (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010). It is a process in which most of individuals beliefs
and interests are shaped through others representation of oneself and to an extent shared values, and contextual specific time/space dynamics (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010). In the realm of IR society, state identities are what determine certain ways of interactions.

As for if state identity is given by international, domestic or both factors, the debate goes deeper and behooves to another investigation. For the purpose and sake of this dissertation, since its main goal is national identity construction, the focus will be over the domestic factors. Further this differentiation will be addressed, in the next section.

2.2. What are we talking about when we talk about National Identity?

In a preliminary stadium, national identity can be understood as “a relational process enacted in social dramas and ‘events’ as well as in everyday practices” (Zubrzycki, 2010). It also can be understood as “one of the many forms of group identity” (Wang & He, 2014, p.140). However, as Ned Lebow has introduced (2012, 2016), there’s no such thing as an identity, but a jumble of ways individuals self-represents. According to him, people change over time and so does its so-called identity. This occurs since no core identification can make people consistent and unique throughout time and different situations.

This self-identifications derive from the roles that a person performs in society (e.g. with family and friends), its affiliations, its relationship with its body, and from stories that other people and they construct about themselves (individual and collective biographies) (Lebow, 2016). Altogether, this multiple identifications constitutes what people assume as their identity.

Moreover, this identifications are labile and constantly change in character. They also rise and fall in importance, often conflicting over time as a result of a function of “priming” (Lebow, 2016). This means that who a person is, or who might think is,
depends on by *who* or *where* is being asked the question, even *when* and in which context (as for example what is going on in the world) the person is in; different self-identifications can “emerge” according to the context and the situation (ibid.).

As for national identity, Lebow says that “[as individual identifications] state identifications are derived largely from roles, affiliations, relationships to bodies and history” (2016, p.73). Moreover, Lebow sets out that unlike people, states do not (or even cannot) have identity³ (2016). Whatsoever, at most there are conflicting self-identifications at a national and international level of society. In that sense, by national identifications he means “not only the descriptions of states and their peoples generated by leaders and citizens alike, but also those generated by external actors” (Lebow, 2016, p.1). To this matter, although Lebow does not establishes this differentiation explicitly, he recognizes that there is both a *state* external construction and a *national* domestic process, which are in constant interaction.

“The literature on identity tends to place it in domestic and international compartments. Constructivist scholars who use identity to understand foreign policy generally too often take it as a given. With notable exceptions, they rarely look at the ways in which national identifications are foci of domestic struggles and also the product of foreign interactions” (2016, p.184).

This linguistic differentiation helps to recognize that there is a domestic struggle to impose on a state different self-identifications, by leaders, officials, the media, public intellectuals, and interest and ethnic groups (Lebow, 2016). Notwithstanding, the external identifications that *states* are given or tried to impose by other actors, also come to play at the *national* level when the general welfare of the citizens is at stake (Lebow, 2016). And so forth, *national* identifications also come to play at the

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³ About this matter, Ned Lebow refers to psychology and the need for *ontological security* in the second chapter of “National identities and International Relations”. Maja Zehfuss also gives some insights about this in “Constructivism and identity” when explaining that identities cannot be essentialize.
state level when they have an impact over states behavior, for instance, foreign policy.

In that sense, it can be assumed that there are domestic and international sources for identity. That said, Lebow (2016) talks about National identifications (as a whole), as the result of a dialectical process between externally imposed and internally generated identifications. Even so, as explained above, the linguistic differentiation Lebow’s approach imply, allows to separate both levels for the sake of a much more profound analysis. This could become problematic to an extent when trying to determine the overall National identifications. Knowing that, this investigation will take place around national identifications, and when necessary, around the dialogue with the state (international) identifications, when context and nature make them impossible obviate.

In this way, at the domestic level national identity is largely affected and shaped by Official and Collective memory. On one hand, governments everywhere attempt to control what can best be described as “official memory” by means of holidays, monuments, school curricula and texts, and reports and other items they disseminate through media” (Lebow, 2016, p.48). As will be explained down, this accounts are contested for they can have implications for domestic and foreign policy. On the other hand, Collective memory is created by the society and groups within it and consist of stylized representations of the past.

This difference lights up the struggle between official and collective identifications. The former, are appealed by officials and leaders as a way to shape behavior of citizens (for example the approval or disregard of a foreign policy, and later the impact of this in its implementation or not) (Lebow, 2016).

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4 “Official memories [...] are those that state agents attempt to impose on the society in order to shape collective and individual memories” (Lebow, 2016, p.135).

5 This process, as all relations for Lebow, is multi wayed (i.e. goes multiple ways and not just one way; all relations interact in multiple ways, not just one way or two way). Hence, identifications are influenced by Official and Collective memory as much as the former influences them. This multi-wayed dialogues also come at stake when talking about the relationship between identifications and behavior.
Nonetheless, to this matter Lebow states that identifications are only one of many sources of behavior:

“Identifications are only one source of behavior. People act for many reasons that have nothing to do with their sense of who they are. They can be motivated by material or other appetites, status concerns, fear, or act out of habit” (2016, p.2).

Moreover, since identifications rise and fall in importance according to context and timing, “they are neither a source of unity and continuity nor can they serve as a steady ethical and behavioral compass” (ibid., 2016, p.71). Identifications are sometimes motive of [political] behavior, and it might change according to which identification is being primed.

According to Lebow, Maja Zehfuss also “argues that identity formation is an active and ongoing project; one cannot essentialize identities or take a snapshot of one and use it to explain behavior over time” (ibid., p.39-40). For this reason, situations in which identifications are more likely to shape behavior should be identified whenever identity is intended to explain states actions (cooperation, foreign policy, war, and so on).

In short, Lebow (2016) states that,

“National identifications, like their individual counterparts, are a composite of multiple identifications. They derive primarily from roles, affiliations, relations to bodies, and autobiographical narratives. As with individuals, these identifications are labile in substance, rise and fall in importance, are sometimes reinforcing, but not infrequently crosscutting. They are constructed by sub state actors, government officials, and the international community. They often appeal more, or only, to specific audiences, making it possible for different groups of citizens to have radically different understandings of their country’s history and what it represents”. (p.138)

In that sense, National identifications derive from a collective construction of roles(1), which appeal to the international roles the state performs, and the influence this has over what citizens think about their state; affiliations(2), as “any

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6 Ned Lebow use this expression when referring to which identifications are being prioritized.
kind of strong attachment to a person, group, or institution (Lebow, 2016, p.109), by no means implying only the sense of friendship; the relations to bodies, being for national identifications the collective conceptions of national territory (and their relation with it); and lastly, autobiographical narratives, as the Collective memory addressed before (an stylized understanding of a country’s people, past, and accomplishments).

2.2.1. International Roles

According to Lebow International society is hierarchical, roles are embedded in hierarchy, and therefore high status roles are willing to be attained for states by its leaders. This roles usually come with privileges but also responsibilities associated with thick rules. Now, there exist Regional and International roles which variate according to the set of values that predominate at each level. For example, “the invocation of so-called Asian values by states like Singapore to justify resistance to Western pressure to implement human rights norms [...]” (ibid., p. 78). However, it shared and promoted before the 1997 economic crisis the so called “Confucian values” associated with regional East Asian values (Hu, 2007).

This Roles have changed since the 1648 treaties of Westphalia, “the conventional starting date of the modern state system” (Lebow, 2016, p.82). Then, for example, Kingdom was a powerful role. Nowadays, as a result of Modernity “the state has become the principal accepted role for actors in the international system” (ibid.). This allows categories under which international roles can be classified; the range proposed by Lebow covers differentiation based on power and dynamics of relationship with other international actors and within states.

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7 In National Identifications it mainly refers to international affiliations (Lebow, 2016).
8 “It is the thinnest of societies but still has important behavioral consequences. International society determines who counts as an actor, what roles are acceptable, which of them have high or low status, how they should be enacted, and who is capable of performing them” (p.77).
9 This has to do with a sense of accomplishment and status over people: “successful role performance builds self-esteem, especially when achievement is recognized and rewarded by others actors” (p.74).
10 “This principle was accepted by the great powers at the Congress of Vienna” (p.78).
• **Great Power**\(^\text{11}\): is a “social and socially legitimated hierarchy within international society” (ibid., p.84). “Attained special rights and corresponding responsibilities, including the duty of upholding the international order” (p.86). “[This] status is conferred by other states, and not every state that appears to meet the criteria is recognized as a great power” (ibid., p.83). “Great powers must be willing and able to uphold the practices and core values of international society” (ibid.).

• **Rising Power:** “applied to states thought to be increasing their power and influence and anxious to join the ranks of great Powers” (ibid., p.87). “Historically, a rising power could be identified by the percentage of national income it allocated to its military and the frequency with which it engaged in war” (ibid.).

• **Dominant Power:** “is an informal status, and there is a consensus that there have been three of them in the last 500 years: Spain in the sixteenth century, France from the mid-seventeenth to early nineteenth century, and the United States since 1945” (ibid., p.90).

• **Failed state:** “is a post-1945 concept that has been applied to political units where order has broken down and government is either nonexistent or too weak to impose its authority and provide security” (ibid.). “It is a highly ideological category, but this is unavoidable because, like most other roles, it is justification to increase or decrease the status and influence of actors” (ibid., p.90-91).

• **Neutral:** “neutral states cannot initiate wars against other states, join other belligerents, provide war material to them, or willingly allow their armed forces to transit or occupy their territories” (ibid., p.92). However, they will “defend themselves against any attacks” (ibid.).

\(^{11}\) “The Ottoman Empire, the United States, Germany, Italy, and Japan were admitted to the club in the course of the nineteenth century, and the Soviet Union and China in the twentieth” (Lebow, 2016, p.83).
• Rouge state: “is a controversial category invented by the Reagan administration to brand and isolate its enemies and justify sanctions against them” (ibid., p.93). “The criteria for qualification as a rogue state include authoritarian rule, little or no respect for human rights, sponsorship of terrorism, and attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction” (ibid.).

• Non state actors: “became increasingly important in the course of the last century. They consist of international organizations and nongovernmental actors (NGOs)” (ibid., p.94).

2.2.2. Affiliations
This dimension is associated in individual affiliations to emotions like friendship, love, repugnance, and hatred. They help to define human’s relationships with others and help determine who they are to them (ibid.). As for states, “international relations theory has largely ignored emotions, especially positive ones. To the extent that theorists or foreign policy analysts address emotions, they focus on hostility and hatred” (ibid., p.110). Leaders of states can have affiliations with other states or leaders which can in turn have impact on national identifications and foreign policy (ibid.). In that sense, Lebow identifies two big affiliations:

• Friendship: it develops through intimate relations that facilitate belonging and recognition (ibid.).

“In international as well as personal relations, friendship is political and to the extent it has power potential. […] there is a strong incentive for individuals and states to make friends to formulate and sustain their respective narratives and identities. In international relations, one of the more significant incentives for this kind of relationship is a shared understanding of a social order that friends are willing to support as an end in itself but also a means of creating more stable identities”. (Lebow, 2016, p.109)
“Friendship is also central to Karl Deutsch’s concept of pluralistic security communities” (ibid.)\textsuperscript{12}.

- **Hostility and hatred**\textsuperscript{13}

This dimension can be analyzed independently of other ones, but it can be closely related to roles. “In practice, friendship and hostility are often closely connected to roles. [For instance,] leaders of a dominant power especially one striving to be a hegemon, are likely to develop hostility toward rising powers that threaten their standing” (ibid., p.110). A sense of responsibility can be developed from great or dominant powers to those states seeking their protection, as for the United States with South Korea and Taiwan.

2.2.3. Bodies

When this dimension applies to political units it refers to territory and people\textsuperscript{14}. States cannot exist without territories as much as people cannot do it without bodies. Also, they cannot exist without people who collectively and politically construct them. “Many states begin as nationalities that aspire to political control over territories they claim as their own. They cannot be recognized as states in the

\textsuperscript{12} For example, “the postwar Franco-German relationship as a case in point. Friendship between these two former enemies, and the collaboration it sustained, led to the construction of partially overlapping national identifications that are at the heart of the European project” (Lebow, 2016, p.109). At one point “the Scandinavian countries, also once adversaries, effectively banished war because it became an increasingly “unthinkable” act among friends. The United States invaded Canada in 1775 and 1812, but gradually a friendship developed between the two peoples, reinforced by frequent cross-border visits, business, and cultural interchanges. The notion of a U.S. invasion of Canada is sufficiently absurd to have provided the premise for the 1995 comedy *Canadian Bacon*. The film is also an effective spoof on the ignorance of Americans about their northern neighbor” (ibid., p.109-110).

\textsuperscript{13} “Studies of Hitler emphasize his hatred of Jews and Slavs and how it shaped his foreign policy. Those of appeasement argue that one important reason Britain and France failed to balance against the Nazi threat was the hostility of their governments toward the Soviet Union. Hostility at the popular level can also be a limiting factor in foreign policy. The level of hostility worldwide toward the U.S. government, as distinct from feelings about the American people, is arguably one important reason why the world’s most powerful country is less and less able to persuade others to do what it wants. Anti-American feeling derives from the perception that the United States often acts unilaterally and contrary to international law and the interests of the wider, global community” (ibid., p.110).

\textsuperscript{14} the People’s Republic of China laid claim to all Chinese, including those living overseas [huaqiao]. As part of its strategy of accommodation within the region it has acknowledged the political separation of overseas Chinese (Lebow, 2016, p.126).
absence of effective control over a territory” (ibid., p.121). Identifications sourced by this dimension are affected by the size of the territory, its geography and possible subdivisions within states generated by the two former. Apart from that, “bodily self-identifications are never static” (ibid., p.124). In states it happens since territory is constrained by its physical knowledge through cartography and other tools, because of political changes, territorial disputes, and changes in how their peoples understand their territory.\(^{15}\)

Also, as for the last idea, because territories have many inhabitants, “they often have diverse understandings of their territory. Most frequently, these understandings reflect different political preferences and projects” (ibid., p.126). This can become problematic, especially in multicultural states.\(^{16}\)

In some cases, “territories are often described metaphorically and assigned symbolic meanings” (ibid., p. 129). For example, Israeli territorial relation with the bible. However, this narratives are liable because feelings around this symbols can variate according to values and beliefs (like religion or ideology).

Lastly, this identifications also can work at different levels since “people can have attachments to multiple territories" (ibid., p.130). This way regional, state, local (and so on) territorial narratives can be complementary or conflictual.

2.2.4. Autobiographies

\(^{15}\) The latter can be seen in China as “for two millennia in China, the Yellow River and the Great Wall symbolized the center and progress. In recent years, Chinese have been encouraged by their government to now regard the Pacific Ocean as the sign of innovation and progress. The new symbol is intended to encourage those in the more developed coastal areas to become more cosmopolitan, and in part reflects this development” (ibid.).

\(^{16}\) For example, in Russia as successor state to a larger empire, “like all such states, its people have struggled to come to terms – or not – with the loss of considerable territory and the status of being the dominant nationality in a multiethnic empire” (ibid.). This can be highly related to the case of China where ethnic Han majority struggles to impose over other ethnic minorities who occupied peripheries, in order to stablish territorial unity. It should be noted that this case works on the basis of ethnic colonization and therefore a sense of separatism rises within this minorities (as the case of Tibet and Xinjiang provinces).

\(^{17}\) “Someone can self-identity as Münchener, Bavarian, German, and European, each of which has a territory and associated narratives” (Lebow, 2016, p.130).
This dimension is historical and builds around national autobiographies. In first place it is a response to political needs which turn into autobiographies to seek emotional and instrumental reasons for solidarity (integration) and loyalty (ibid.). “In the modern era, states cannot survive or compete successfully unless they command the loyalty of their citizens and build solidarity among them” (ibid., p.131-132). In that sense, these narratives are usually constructed at the domestic level.

As a political mean, it does not respond to a certain or single political group, but rather *usually* functions as a coexistent dynamic.

“They are a product of competition for influence among political actors and factions, bureaucracies, interest and ethnic groups, and other communities. Many of these actors propagate historical narratives that foster values and identifications they believe to be conducive to their psychological needs and political goals” (ibid., p.132).

Moreover, this narratives do not respond to only one set of interpretations and values. One narrative can be interpreted differently by individuals, groups or political factions that follow different ends.

Lastly, national narratives are constantly being “rewritten” in response to social changes or psychological needs and can “often describe the past in ways that bear little relationships to facts or how events were understood at the time” (ibid., p. 134). In that sense, the historical narratives exist as a contextual individual/collective response of psychological and/or political needs, and Official memory change over time according to those. For example, foreign and national policies can be pursued to advance particular understatements of the country\(^{18}\).

As for the dynamics and how this dimensions interact with each other, Lebow warns that “there is no evidence that any basis of national identification is more important than others. Most narratives draw on some combination of roles, affiliations, bodies, and histories” (2016, p. 138). Its importance is given according to each country and situation but, according to him, some weak generalizations

\(^{18}\) Different national narratives coexist but can also be conflictual. It can happen that upper (official) narratives are not well received either by elites or big groups of society.
can be made. This generalization can also serve the purpose of examples when trying to understand how the four dimensions work and could interact:

- “People who live in states with high-status roles are more likely to emphasize them in their national identifications than people who do not. This reflects the importance of status, but also the fact that high-status roles confer distinctiveness [...].” (ibid., p.138).
- The most common kind of affiliation is with neighboring countries where there are good relations between groups of people and states and considerable cross-border exchange. Such affiliations can become important sources of pride and national identification [...]”¹⁹ (ibid.).
- “Changes in any kind of identification can encourage or compel reformulation of others²⁰” (ibid., p. 139).
- “New national identifications require justifications, which are provided by historical narratives. To be successful, they must address events already

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¹⁹ “[...] as they are in Scandinavia, and more recently between France and Germany. The French have held out their collaboration as evidence of their central role in the European project, regarded by many members of the elite as a modern means of achieving gloire. For Germans, this friendship between former enemies is evidence of Germany’s new and valued role as a good neighbor. Creating good relations with France, and even more with Germany’s neighbors to the east, required changes in territorial concepts. As noted, the Federal Republic officially recognized postwar boundaries in its several treaties with Poland. Governments and publics in Poland and the Czechoslovakia – and elsewhere in Europe– monitored how German media and people readjusted their territorial understandings, which in turn reinforced their willingness to cooperate with and trust the Federal Republic” (Lebow, 2016, p. 138).

²⁰ For example, “(1) gain and loss of territory for Prussia and Germany prompted redefinition of roles, affiliations, and autobiographies. (2) Changes in affiliations [in the case of] American colonial students in Britain encouraged changes in territorial conceptions, which in turn had profound political implications for relations between the Thirteen Colonies and the mother country. Educated colonial elites found themselves in limbo; they had rejected many of the values of the traditional societies of their origin but were treated as second-class citizens at best by the society into which they had tried to assimilate. Nationalism was a psychological strategy to make them whole again. They sought affiliation with intellectuals and workers in the homelands and to mobilize them to create independent states and a culture to which they could belong. In these examples changes in affiliation occurred at the individual level. Enough influential people had strong psychological incentives to change their affiliations and then encourage their friends and associates to adopt them as well. Over time, a cascading process spread self-identifications among the population. This process offers further evidence of the complex interactions between individual and national identifications” (Lebow, 2016, p. 139).
considered central to the country’s identity” (ibid.). This is mainly accomplished through Collective (Official) memory.

The above shows that National Identity is given by interactions between dimensions in which, even if they are constantly fluctuating (and never ceases being), ones prime over others according to context. In that sense, it is rather difficult to establish, as he mentions, generalizations (correlations) applicable to all countries. This way, the case of China and its National identity will follow the examples given by Lebow; universal correlations will not be attempted21.

2.3. Worlding as an alternative perspective on different ontological frameworks

Lately, there’s been a struggle in the IR’s field for making it more inclusive and plural, in order to overcome its strains and boundaries. That’s why, Arlene Tickner and David Blaney appeal to the limitations of the discipline’s conceptual and categorical toolboxes and work to advocate for “distinct ways of knowing grounded in diverse lived experiences or ways of being in the world” (2017, p. 294). For such, it is crucial to make a shift from questions of epistemology to questions of ontology22.

This idea came to be from the belief that there is a dominant knowledge system that pretends to create a universe by performing acts of ontological erasure (Blaney & Tickner, 2017). The reality, although, is that there are multiple (and hybrid) reals, and not just one given reality. This is important “mainly because the ways in which distinct social groups go about living their lives and making their worlds, not just how they know and represent them, are at stake” (Blaney & Tickner, 2017, p.294). It concerns then, to the ways of leaving and not just those of representation.

21 As Lebow’s work itself still is an exploratory investigation.
22 By ontology the authors mean “the study of what exists (or what is real), including our own conditions of being” (Blaney & Tickner, 2017, p.296).
Considering the above, according to Bruno Latour, western modern knowledge depicts reality (thus its thinking and practices) within a cartesian division, formed by *great dichotomies*, in the main being nature/culture, human/non-human, fact/value, mind/body and animate/inanimate. This would be considered the only reality, unstained by prejudices political interest, power or culture. For instance, western knowledge would conceive nature as unitary and stable in opposition to culture, for which would be various beliefs about. However, “many communities do not sharply distinguish humans and other entities, so that animals, plants and spirits are as much ‘people’ (with consciousness, culture and language) as ‘we’ are” (ibid., p.296). In other words, they don’t, or even can’t, separate Nature from Culture, what would absolutely prove for the existence of another cosmology(ies).

Nonetheless, these different interpretations are taken as “distinct and unscientific representations of the same world” (ibid., 2017, p.296) by the modern knowledge, which is so entrenched that rarely surface for inspection. Having said that, this disregard of difference wipes out other cosmologies, and annihilates in the academic sphere the opportunity for some to speak out for them. “John Law reports that scientific methods are not procedures that simply depict nature, but world-making exercises with performative results that create the appearance of singularity and boundedness” (As cited in Blaney & Tickner, 2017, p. 296). In that sense, science ends up extinguishing other realities and turning into a form of colonial power (Blaney & Tickner, 2017).

According to Amitav Acharya, IR discipline does not fall far from this colonial practices and thinking, basically because “it is the universities, scholars, and publishing outlets in the West that dominate and set the agenda” (as cited in Blaney & Tickner, 2017, p.301). To some extent, constructivism may seem to have capitalized this way of thinking based on the world and reality existing first in the thought of individuals. However, they depict reality as one and as the result of shared beliefs about it. Then again, academy usually portrays different realities as
cultural beliefs (about the same world), instead of different worlds or natures (Blaney & Tickner, 2017).

Acknowledging other cosmologies offers a new insight in the Western knowledge machinery as a struggle to exert erasure pressure over other realities; therefore, it opens a new window of ontology politics. In that sense, this kind of dynamics have marginalized voices in politics. Then, in order to recognize this views it is not necessary to criticize western ontological perspective, but to conceive the world as a diplomatic project of coexistence between realities (ibid.).

By no means, the above implies to “escape” from the “one world-world” view, since it is also a cosmology. Rather, it is to understand that “knowledge built within the boundaries of formal academic practice and “one-world world” thinking does not exhaust the possibilities for meaningful scientific contributions” (Blaney & Tickner, 2017, p.309). What’s more, it should be a clamor to engage in a “walking with” cosmopolitics.

That said, Ned Lebow investigations frames into this discussion specially since he is imbued into the western like logics. Even though, he does not fail to recognize that there is a need to “reconstruct the world through the eyes of actors [in order] to understand their behavior” (Lebow, 2016, p.2); he also highlights the centrality of individual and collective self representations in identifications building, as seen above. In that sense, as a way to overcome the limitations of IRs theories, an alternative to approach the Chinese national identity can be through its culture as the reflex of its own cosmology and not as mere beliefs. Therefore, an approximation to anthropology could facilitate and give new insights more suitable to Chinese ontologies, since culture is taken as a portray of conditions of being.

A forewarning about cosmology should be made. It is here defined as “a series of assumptions about the origins and the evolution of the cosmos. In this sense, ontologies and cosmologies can be said to co-constitute each other” (Blaney & Tickner, 2017, p.296). However, the implications of Chinese cosmology on national
identity could make another whole different investigation. Therefore, if it will be considered for the upcoming analysis, not much effort will be put into explaining and analyzing them alone. A bigger emphasis will be put on its reflex on identity (as identifications).

2.4. On deconstruction

This section is an attempt to explain a small portion of what constitutes Derridian deconstruction. Almost every author included in this matter here recommends reading his work rather than approach it just through other works about his. However, in order to understand it, is necessary to have a profound philosophical knowledge since he engages in multiple dialogues with other philosophers and complex philosophical terms. In that sense, the authors here mentioned also recognize that their works even if not try to signify Derrida’s work, aim to brighten up or summarize deconstruction panorama.

Above all, deconstruction is a complex and difficult way of striping off the forever changing systems of signification and ideas in written texts (Zehfuss, 2009). In theory, it serves to find the “real” signification of ideas, and in turn depict flaws and contradictions, or even overcome erratic interpretations of texts. But this is easier said than done. That is why, even if there is no consensus as for the rules an norms, there is a generally accepted preliminary way of approaching deconstruction, be it the “double reading” (Filary, 2014).

According to it, in order to understand the utmost “meaning” of a text/idea, the deconstructing reader draws upon two readings of the text. The first reading should just be a repetition of the text, which in the end can only be an interpretation and therefore a commentary on the text (ibid.). With it, “the aim of [the] commentary is to show the reproducibility and stability of conventional interpretation of a given text” (Filary, 2014, p.136); it is not yet identifying the “meaning”. Therefore, the first reading should show what the text means to most of the readers, and a minimal consensus around how it should be understood.
The second reading is the subverting of the dominant interpretation. It “should acquire the quality of being outside of the text, and yet still have strong relation to its inner logic” (ibid.). It is then, a reading outside the text but connected with it. The “second moment” needs to come from the first interpretation. Therefore, it is a moment of alterity (Crithley & Mooney, as cited in Filary, 2014), where the double reading is given by a semantic ambivalence of the use of a word or idea (Derrida, as cited in Filary, 2014). The second reading is done by demonstrating the aporias and ellipses of thought (Roy, 2010).

That said, the end of this dissertation is not to criticize the systems of the text to read, but to understand realities depicted on them; complete deconstruction is not the final aim. To understand why, it must be said that deconstruction is given by the assumption that Western thought is structured by dichotomies in opposition, which are the result of a process of perpetual movements of creation of differences (Différence), where one is consider positive and the other negative (Zehfuss, 2009). This process purpose is not to “find” the universal meaning of an idea or word, since the dynamic processual nature of texts makes it impossible to mold an essence thus origin (Filary, 2014); rather it is about common understanding.

Derrida strike this system by proving that one cannot exist without the other, in the sense that they are not exclusive opposites, but otherness of each other: Henry Staten depicts it as “X is constituted by non-X” (as cited in Zehfuss, 2009, p.142).

Now, as said before, meaning cannot be traced in the sense of [metaphysic] essence, but as contextual system of common understanding. In order to find what texts really meant (not even what the author tried to communicate), dichotomies should be established based on a time contextualized system (Zehfuss, 2009; Filary, 2014).

This is not the utmost end of deconstruction. It keeps going into subverting that system in order to expose the contradictions within the intended opposition, and much more. However, since the end of this dissertation is not criticizing
phenomena rather than understanding it, analysis won’t go beyond establishing the dichotomies.

That said, for Derrida written texts are not the only way of reality thus denying the impact of materiality on it (Zehfuss, 2009). For him, every social interaction is mediated by texts, being that they are constituted by systems themselves (ibid.). Notwithstanding, he does give written text an utmost importance.

About them, however, he stands that because western thinking is structured by dichotomies (i.e. concepts that appear to be polarized opposites and are meant to be mutually exclusive), the idea of presence over absence is more valued (ibid.). Text is portrayed as the negative opposite of speech. Derrida calls this logocentrism, which comes from the western thinking that ideas are better understood in the “presence” of a communicator (ibid.). He criticizes that thinking by saying presence cannot be conceived without absence since it is given by its own motion into the past and present, which are absences (ibid.). Therefore, there is no absolute presence.

That last idea is later explained by saying that dichotomies are not mutually exclusive. Both terms are not independent of each other; one cannot be conceived without the other. For example, Derrida shows that even if one thing is present or absent (never present and absent), it is impossible to ignore that absence is necessary to make presence possible (ibid).

“In Derrida’s example of speech versus writing he argues that speech is a form of writing in general, meaning, it is a system for recording and thus producing meaning. Therefore, we cannot make sense of things if we try to distinguish between speech and writing”. (Zehfuss, 2009, p.143)

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23 Here it should be noticed that this preference is not given by the idea that writing is better (or positive) than speech, because this attempts against his idea that dichotomies are not exclusive themselves and that there should not be established any hierarchy between them. This, also because he says that one concept cannot be conceived without the other.
The examples show that dichotomies are just one coin with two faces: neither is “better”, and the coin will never exist without both of them. Although this example is not enough and cannot explain why both concepts would not exist without each other, the examples offered by Derrida do.

Considering the above, for Derrida, in texts, not only what is “written” can be a depiction of reality. Humán (2003) explains that texts can be exemplified as following: when in a dark room a lantern is turned on at the same time it discovers what it lights, it hides what remains in the dark. Western thinking tradition is based in the idea of the light (and what is lighted) being reality. However, this reality is just a selection which leaves elements outside, it is not the whole image. In that sense, texts are not just what is written but also what is not. Western tradition pretends to convert what is present into the ideology and signification of the text (ibid).

This epistemology also stands in part from the conception that no one possesses the full significance of their words, and therefore texts are the only ideas expressed that escape from the communicator’s mediation (Roy, 2010). Texts write themselves to an extent, because they are independent of an author or his intentions; they establish a direct communication with the receptor without nobody mediating the ideas (ibid). Hence, the centrality of reading (and readers) falls in its construction of meaning: “for [Derrida] reading is itself an act of writing; that is, reading does not decipher the given meaning of a text but is part of creating that meaning” (Zehfuss, 2009, p.144).

In that sense, texts function as systems where no meaning comes from a set essence, but variate according to interpretations changing over time (Filary, 2014). According to this idea, the most accurate meaning of texts and actual ideas are contextual and cannot be learned without overturning the altered system that consolidated outside the given context (Filary, 2014). This means, that the texts system should be restored in order to apprehend its “real” meaning (ibid.).
Lastly, deconstruction comes from a tradition of thinking which stand against meaning, representation and knowledge as an autonomous and absolute enclosed system, be it poststructuralism (Humán, 2003). Therefore, deconstruction questions the meaning of texts of any discursive practice, literary or not; it resists enclosed systems. This is also why deconstruction cannot be defined as a universal discourse, finite and closed; this idea should be denied in benefit of the infinite and open diversity it proclaims (ibid).

2.5. Knitting over unexplored perspectives

Lastly, it should be recall that Lebow’s national identifications are at a continuous struggle to prevail over other identifications. Even if he does not explicitly conceive them like that, his conceptualization of the identifications comes from a conflictual multilevel relationship between the different identifications given by the four principal dimensions named above. In that sense, his understanding of the world is always framed by the idea that is really a struggle rather than a dialogue.

This conflict is highlighted when he explains the roles as the struggle for living up to the external imposed roles (identifications), or when individuals trying to constrain outside identifications of them to conjoin with their [own] self-identifications. Also, when putting it as a solely act of political ending when addressing biographies. It is always a source of distress.

Even if this conceptualization would seem to serve the means to ease theorization in other realms like cooperation24, in the case of China (and probably other societies; maybe also the international society) national identifications are not conflictual.

The problem of western dichotomies as excluding opposites and somehow conflictual poles is stressed in his way of thinking, and therefore cannot conceived

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24 For insights on this matter refer to Lebow’s book “National identities and International Relations”, chapter five, “Cooperation”.
identities as a real dialogue (the foremost attempt of Lebow to introduce them as a multilevel dialogue).

Moreover, Lebow’s thinking fails to give space to unfold one important characteristic of Chinese National identity construction process: it is not a power struggle but largely a process of compromise between official identifications and popular identifications. This deficiency is certainly given by the fact that Chinese thinking about world and their ways of being in that world differ radically from Lebow’s Western constructed thinking. This is not wrong per se, but it fails to recognize the ontological perspective approached above.

Another investigation about this topic could be done, but for now it is only to recall the centrality of “popular” national identifications to the project of official national identity, at least in the case of China.

3. SOCIO POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHINA VIS-Á-VIS THE EFFECTS OF OPENING AND REFORM

The following chapter roughly explains the change of the historic panorama from an enclosed China, led by Mao Tse Tung (from 1949 till his death in 1976), to its opening in 1978, with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms. Then, the historical approach focuses on the main social, cultural, and to an extent, political impact of China’s world opening. A small emphasis will be made on the development of cultural and social performances, especially literature. Also, the development of Confucianism in Chinese society and politics will be addressed, since it is widely associated with the government ideology and Chinese society practices and ways of being.

3.1. Winds of change

After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, under the leadership of Mao Tse Tung, all elements of society, culture, economy and politics

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25 Henry Kissinger offers a complete historical count of the country in his book On China (2011), which is the basis for this whole section.
pursued social revolution ideology. In that order, Chinese life was led by an authoritarian government which promoted the collectivization of land. This socioeconomic model attempted to break with class struggle, over which Mao laid heavy emphasis. In that sense, no citizen could be owner of land, and state would administer it and its revenues; as a matter of fact, state also owned all enterprises.

"In 1958, at the outset of the nationwide program of economic collectivization known as the Great Leap Forward, Mao outlined his vision of China in perpetual motion. Each wave of revolutionary exertion, he proclaimed, was organically a precursor to a new upheaval whose beginning needed to be hastened lest the revolutionaries became indolent and start resting on their laurels [...]." (Kissinger, 2011, n.p.)

Moreover, Mao advocated for a self-sustainable economy that would not depend on neoliberalism logics, particularly unequal international trade and free market. In that sense, and taking as prime example the Soviet Union, the state led economy first focused on industrialization and steel production over agriculture. Farmers were dragged out to produce iron and many crops were left to rotten. However, the new iron was of no good quality because of the lack of appropriate infrastructure. As a result, big famines came, and the economy collapsed.

The outgrowth, Chinese people raged, and opposition to the government started to rise in the masses and, even worst for Mao, inside the Communist Party. This led him to focus on strengthening the socialist ideals, and in 1966 the Cultural Revolution campaign was launched; cultural and ideological trials started. Here, not only the economic constraints were evident, but also the ideological restrictions became stricter. Many people were pursued and reeducated, and many more were killed. Educated people, intellectuals, musicians, writers and artist became a common target, and just the fact of knowing how to read became a synonym of treason in the more radical regions.
This tragic period only ended with the death of Mao in 1976. However, the scars on the nation and its people were deep, and its sorrow was reflected on the economic, social and cultural decadency the country was left sunken in.26

“The immediate impact of the Cultural Revolution was disastrous. After the death of Mao, the assessment by the second and third generations of leaders—almost all of whom were victims at one time or another—has been condemnatory. Deng Xiaoping, the principal leader of China from 1979 to 1991, argued that the Cultural Revolution had nearly destroyed the Communist Party as an institution and wrecked its credibility at least temporarily”. (Kissinger, 2011, n.p.)

Short after Mao’s death, his recently named prime minister Hua Guofeng also managed to inherit the party’s leadership and become head of the Central Military Commission. Even so, he lacked the authority once exuded by Mao, and quickly resigned in favor of Deng Xiaoping.

Unlike Mao, Deng was a reformist and advocated for the liberalization of the economy, led by a socialist central state (what he called “socialism with Chinese characteristics”). Such ideas had brought him problems in the past, when he was labeled as a traitor and purged (he was sent to reeducation fields twice). However, with his slowly gained influence, he managed to overcome opposition and started to implement reforms on the Chinese economy, with a carefully managed free market.

The reforms were basically a denounce of the blind orthodoxy that followed Maoist ideology, on government and economy, which had led to a deficit on technology, development and a poorer economy. Deng, therefore, advocated for the economic development based on education, technology and science. For him, education was the gate to professionalization of labor. Also, in order to streamline the competition, a system based on meritocracy rather than ideology, was introduced. Along with this, Deng emphasized the importance of a world open free market economy. He

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26 Notwithstanding, Chinese people never set aside their “commitment” to their society, and so the period has never been addressed as a massacre.
highlighted the success of the Japanese economic model of industrialization by import substitution and planned to replicate it in China.

“In a May 1977 speech, he challenged China to “do better” than the Meiji Restoration, Japan’s dramatic modernization drive of the nineteenth century. Invoking Communist ideology to encourage what amounted to a market economy, Deng suggested that “as proletarians,” the Chinese would be able to exceed a program engineered by the “emerging Japanese bourgeoisie” [...]Unlike Mao, who appealed to his people by the vision of a transcendent, glorious future, Deng challenged them into a major commitment to overcome their backwardness [...]” (Kissinger, 2011, n.p.)

The socio-economic paradigm changed, and ideology went into the background to give the place to a new doctrine of “pragmatism”. Priority had to be given to consumer goods over heavy industry, creativity and individual thinking had to be encouraged, and it was important to decentralize government. For the first time in the Republic’s history, the Communist Party would stop to interfere so much in the private life. For that purpose, the so promoted social state of anarchy of the last decade had to end, and a new order had to be followed.

3.2. The early impacts of the ‘open doors’ policy

With Deng’s reforms, the significant liberalization and the influx of outside influences, the resurgence of social, cultural and even political diversity began. The newly open-door policy brought the massive entry of foreign cultural products to the country. The official, collective and dialectic ethos that prevailed in cultural manifestations during the revolutionary period was replaced by a new sense of individuality (Baranovitch, 2003). The demonstration of feelings such as the love between a man and a woman is one example of the changes form a collective to individual thinking Chinese people crashed with. Of course, there were prompted and catalyzed by the emergence of a new “private life”.

The Party was weakening under the wave of new technologies like cassettes and movies, which were much harder to control, and represented a faster way of share and movement of ideas. It became harder for the government to exert control over
the domain of culture production and dissemination. Furthermore, the forces that strove for a change gained more power than the conservative ones, causing for a new political dynamic to emerge: “large portions of society were now taking the liberty of not following official prescriptions” (ibid., p.16). People once quelled were gaining voices that not always corresponded to the state’s voice. Additionally, the new decentralization and diversification came with some western values and brought the revival as well of prerevolutionary native practices, like regionalism.

For the first time in decades, culture was no longer being imposed unilaterally from above. From this point forward, culture was constructed and transformed through a process of constant public negotiation (ibid., p.2).

3.3. The Confucianism fallacy

Confucianism during most of China’s history prior to the 1911 Revolution, dating to as far as 140 BCE (with the sixth emperor of the Han dynasty, Wu), was a state ideology. In consequence, despite its declining status in the past century, especially during the Chinese Republic period between 1912-1927 and the Mao communist era (1949-1976), it has continued to shape Chinese attitudes and behavior (Hu, 2007). Nowadays there are two different views around the contemporary relevance of Confucianism: those who dismisses it as irrelevant because of its lost of institutional bases (with the demise of the monarchy); and those who believe Confucian values counterbalances western cultural and political values deficiencies, and that those are not excluding, but rather compatible.

Now, it is important to understand that historically Confucianism influence limits have been diluted between politics, culture and economy spheres. Moreover, this influence has traditionally showed periods of fluctuation of importance throughout its history (ibid.). It is the result of a cyclical pattern of decline and ascent of the status of Confucianism. This has happened also during the history of the Popular Republic of China (ibid.).
As it was mentioned before, Mao exerted a tough policy over cultural and religious divergence (among others) from communist thinking; this included Confucianism, which was target of harsh critics and anti-Confucianism campaigns. All that raged came from the idea that it was the ideology of exploitative class, since it aspired to restore the old order. It also contradicted the Marxism’s class struggle. Despite the widespread hostility to Confucianism even after Mao’s death, it survived. Deng reintroduced the civil service examination (Kējǔ 科举, a traditional Confucian concept\(^{27}\)); also, the Party attempted to resort to Confucianism “to alleviate growing social conflicts and to ease the impact of foreign cultures” (ibid., p.142), during the first stages of economic reform.

Nowadays, study of Confucianism thought has been reintroduced in universities (one big example being the “guo-xue” or study of traditional Chinese culture, in The People’s University of China), and is been depicted as the face of the “Confucius Institutes”, China’s soft power tool par excellence. However, “it should be noted that Confucianism on China has been exaggerated” (ibid., p.143), mainly because there were also great influences in force (like Taoism and Buddhism) throughout history.

It surely has become a tool for the government, but it also differs from Confucianism doctrine, so it can’t be assumed as a unified ideology. This can be explained with what Shaohua Hu (2007) calls “the layers of meaning in Confucianism”: the *inner circle* contains Confucian doctrine; the *intermediate circle* contains the Chinese state’s ideology, based on but different from Confucian doctrine; and the *outer circle* which is where Confucian traditions constitute\(^{28}\).

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\(^{27}\) “The civil service examination system, a method of recruiting civil officials based on merit rather than family or political connections, played an especially central role in Chinese social and intellectual life from 650 to 1905. Passing the rigorous exams, which were based on classical literature and philosophy, conferred a highly sought-after status, and a rich literati culture in imperial China ensued”. (Berkshire Encyclopedia of China, 2009, p. 405)

\(^{28}\) “Although Chinese traditions were complex and evolving, Confucianism played a very important role in Chinese traditions with the former often equated with the latter” (Hu, 2007, p.143).
According to this division it can be understood that what is called a Confucian influence over society and government is far away of classic Confucius doctrine. Then, what is called as Confucianism should just be recognize as state ideology and traditions. In that sense, contrary to what could be usually thought, National Identity will be separated from any intent for analyzing it through Confucianism as a political doctrine.

4. CHINESE NATIONAL IDENTITY AFTER THE REFORM

This chapter focus on identifying if changes in Chinese National Identity take place after the economic reforms of 1978. As explained before, national identifications take place at various levels, but, at least in the case of China, those are in dialogue and not in distress. However, it must be recognized that because National Identity refers to a collective signification of “The State”, the official significations (identifications) are the ones to enter to interact directly at the international level. Also,

“[when] writing about this process, Pierre Bourdieu argues that the state penetrates our innermost selves through its role in forming our language, lives, laws, identities, and feelings about the most intimate aspects of life. His claim, while perhaps exaggerated, captures an essential truth because so many people identify strongly with their states and are influenced by them in ways they do not necessarily recognize” (Lebow, 2016, p.1).

That is why, in order to identify changes in National Identity, firstly the official identifications are the ones to be searched. This process will take place analyzing the Chinese Constitution of 198229. Changes of possible official national identifications will be searched in changes over the document: with each political shift in China, the Preamble gets modifications at each National People’s Congress that has taken place after the creation of this Constitution (annex 1); also, changes into the Articles are going to be analyzed to identify the phenomena. After

29 The Chinese Constitution of 1982 and its amendments where retrieved from the website of China’s NPC Observer (n.d.), the website of the University of Southern California US-China Institute (n.d.), and the website of USA’s Congressional-Executive Commission on China (n.d.).
identifying official national identification changes, literary works of recognized and popular Chinese writers corresponding to the second period are going to be analyzed to identify if national identifications there correspond to the ones find in the Constitution.

Beforehand, it is necessary to be clarified that even if the first intention of this work was to identify National identity changes, it cannot be assured as evidence of the whole Chinese National Identity of those periods. This is because, even if it can depict changes, the national identifications recognized correspond to the ones depicted only in the Constitution and the literary works; because of what was explained before of texts as enclosed systems, this dissertation focuses on the texts. As for the collectivization (collective socialization) of those identities, it could lead to another full investigation.

4.1. Why the Constitution

As said before, the state (official) national identity is going to be extracted from the state’s constitution of 1982, specifically the preamble and the changes on it or, sometimes, the articles.

In order to understand why the Constitution (and far more important, its preamble[s]) is the object of analysis, the reader must know that “the evolution of constitutions over time tell us much about political values and behavior” (Charlton, 2010, p.177). Changes of constitution or over the constitution often signals shifts of power. Also, it should be mentioned that Lebow highlights the power of law and official documentation when advancing state (or state elites) interest over the citizenship (2016); this applies also to the Constitution in the case of China (please notice it does not refer only to liberal constitutions).

After the 1978 reforms, economic development came hand in hand with a legal and constitution consciousness and gradually took root in the minds of ‘ordinary people’ (Qianfan, 2012). The process of constitutionalism in China is far from the classical liberal conception of state power restriction,
“The essence of European and American constitutions—that the power of the state is defined and restrained by basic law—is absent from the Chinese political tradition. Rather, law has traditionally been viewed as a tool at the service of state […]” (Carlton, 2010, p. 189).

Yet, it does help to recognize shifts of power and political thought. Moreover, Charlton explains that with every important leadership shift, the preamble of the constitution is changed with the introduction of the new upcoming thinking, or old values and ideas expected to be highlighted (Chang, Thio, Tan & Yeh, 2014). Despite the constitution having supreme authority (nominally), “it remains a socialist instrument embodying aspirations of the CCP. It is not a legal charter to curb the control of state power, but rather centralizes power in the state” (Chang, Thio, Tan & Yeh, 2014, p. 45). This is a caveat that leads to believe it is an important reference of state thinking.

4.2. Changes

As mentioned before, China’s [and Deng’s] constitution of 1982 has been revised several times. The annex 1 shows that the constitution has been amended five times since its creation, in 1988, 1993, 1999, 2004 and 2018. This changes have usually followed important political events or power changes; the only amend that didn’t followed that patron was the 1988 revision. This can be explained because no political power change had recently taken place (apart from Deng Xiaoping’s) and therefore neither important amendments were made (annex 2). As for the other ones, in 1993 Jiang Zemin, Deng Xiaoping's successor, became President of the People’s Republic of China, after the Falun Gong movement was violently

30 Moreover, it has printed the thinking of leaders who one way or another, represented China (nationally and internationally): “the procedures for drafting and issuing both state and party constitutions have been similar: deliberation and writing by a committee of high-ranking leaders under the direction of preeminent leaders such as Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, or Hu Jintao, and approval by either the National People’s Congress (state) or the CCP National Party Congress. This ratification process has helped legitimize both the constitutional document and the political changes it marked” (Carlton, 2010, p. 191).

31 As seen in annex 2, 1988 amendments only included two articles (11 and 10) which introduce in the constitution the private sector. The reforms initiated in 1979 already had experienced the opening of the private sector.
clashed and after the violent crackdown of Tiananmen Square demonstrations (annex 1). Two years before the 1999 amendments Deng Xiaoping died (1997), and one year before Zhu Rongji succeeded Li Peng as premier. In 2004 Hu Jintao became president of the Central Military Commission after becoming General Secretary of the Communist Party (2002) and President of the People's Republic of China (2003). Lastly, one year before the 2018 amendments, the Communist Party voted at its congress to enshrine Xi Jinping's name and ideology in its constitution, elevating him to the level of Mao Zedong.

According to the above, it was decided to take four periods of analysis, namely 1983-1993, period of the early implementation of the 1982 constitution and its first amendment; 1994-1999, covering the period until the third amendment; 2000-2004, period until the fourth amendment; and 2005-2018, until the period of the fifth amendment. This periods are selected because changes that led to amendments on the constitution took place between them. The literary works for the second period is *I Love Dollars and Other Stories of China* by Zhu Wen.

### 4.2.1. First Period: 1983-1993

As shown in annex 1, here took place the introduction of the concept of "socialist market economy" in the preamble, and introduction of the idea of "the primary stage of socialism" (socialist modernization along the socialist road with Chinese characteristics. Planed economy provisions are deleted (Arts. 15, 16, 17), and replaced by the notions of "socialist market economy" and "macro regulation". The term "People's Commune" is deleted, and the system of collective ownership changed into the household responsibility system.

Constitutional changes in this period are more related to the dimension of Affiliations (Arts. 10, 11, 7, 15, 16 and 17 and the Preamble, as seen in annex 2).

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32 Annex 2 shows that leaders thinking was added to the constitution after they finished their terms in power and were succeeded. Xi Jinping's case is a new exception and a demonstration of his big power.
In those it can be tell that the public sector of the economy is seen as a way to control the private sector and that the state, also as a mean of regulation, precedes the natural and the legal person. In that order of ideas, the messages revolve around the idea that the private sector of the economy is not and should not be the leading force in the growth of the economy. Therefore, the state reasserts its predominance over other economic actors (private sector and people for instance). Notwithstanding its reassurance over new economic actors, state also assures to show a friendly face as law regulations of the economy grant a sense of protection and stability to the private sector. Also, the fact that state protects the socio economic order, shows that it is willing to protect whoever or whichever forms part of that order (private and, especially, foreign enterprises).

Now, another important issue is that in the 1988 revision the concept *democratic management* is introduced (annex 2, arts. 16 & 17). This is really important because, when appealing to democratic practices in the economy they appeal to economic systems that function under the same principles, especially because this ensures their autonomy before Chinese political matters.

In this case there is another set of identifications that is important, and it is the relation to Bodies (Arts. 7, 8, 42 and the Preamble). About the “territory”, in the seventh paragraph of the preamble the following sentence is included: “under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people’s democratic dictatorship and follow the socialist road [...]”. The part in italics can be interpreted as and effort form the government to “untie or separate” the National Identity of the national territory. This means that Chinese National Identity is not limited to a geographical space that would correspond to the national territory. Even if this can be thought of as something obvious, the fact that it is highlighted in the constitution says a lot about the responsibility of Chinese citizens the state is expecting them to fulfill even when being outside the national territory.
Now, in the constitutional National Identity what seems to prevail is the state over the people. Even if economy is said to be owned by the whole people (annex 2), state controls this economy (in this period the state own enterprises respond only to the state, not the people). In that sense, economy exists first for the benefit of the state and then, by extension, citizens.

Even thought, Chinese people have the right to use land for private motives; land still belongs to the Chinese people under a socialist system. Therefore, they are expected to cherish their land as their own property. Also, the ideal Chinese citizen, according to the State, is that who works hard in the name of the country and takes its place as the master of it; state urge people to fulfill their role (which can be associated to Confucianism).

The dichotomies system that was established according to the analysis is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliations</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>Private sector</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Socialism</th>
<th>Inside</th>
<th>State owned economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>Private Property</td>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>Outside</td>
<td>Free market economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic law</td>
<td>Democratic economy</td>
<td>Economic management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic anarchy</td>
<td>Undemocratic economy</td>
<td>Political management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bodies</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>Patriotism</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Collective ownership of the land</th>
<th>Honor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>National territory</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Individual ownership of the land</td>
<td>Dishonor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>Loyalty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Treason</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the dichotomies are based on the articles amended of the Constitution. To see which ones are refer to annex 2.

Summing up the above, and as Lebow would say, the forms of identification primed in this period in the Constitution would be affiliations and bodies. The first, as a positive struggle pursuing a friendly approach to foreign private economic "traditions" but reinforcing the leading national role of the state; in this sense, a friendly approach to capitalist countries is being introduced [indirectly] and can be
said to no longer be enemies of the Maoist revolution. And the second, as a sense of responsibility that Chinese are expected to feel, even transcending the geographical barriers and limits; loyalty is expected from Chinese citizens even when outside the country.

4.2.2. Second Period: 1994-1999

As mentioned in annex 1, in this amendment of the Constitution the primary stage of socialism is reaffirmed. The status of the private sector is elevated from "a compliment" (1988) to the "important constituent component" of the socialist market economy (Art.11). There is also a change from the sentence "counter revolutionary activities" punishable by the state to "unlawful activities that harm the state security" (Art. 28). Also, here takes place the declaration that China is committed to "administration of the state according to law", and construction of a "socialist rule of law state" (Art.5).

Changes over the Constitution in this period are more related to the dimension of *autobiographies* (Arts. 11, 28 and the preamble). On one hand, an important highlight of the amendments is that Deng Xiaoping is added in this preamble. This act is a reflex of how they are trying to make him not just part of PRC history but also an important symbol of it: his thought is added next to Mao’s and Marxist-Leninist thought, almost elevating him at the same level. Now, the big difference is in that his thinking revolves around a socialist market economy and not so much political doctrine.

On the other hand, the *individual* aspect of the economy is recognized as a major component of the socialist market economy\(^\text{33}\) (Art.11 in annex 2). Now individualism (and better economic individuality) becomes a feature to feel proud about. Now, the fact that the government is willing to defend people’s right to individual private property can give a feeling of liberty, a limited but still some more

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\(^{33}\) *Individuality* already existed with the economic reforms’ introduction and was added in the article 10 in 1988. However, it wasn’t until 1999 that individuals were textually recognized as “major components of the socialist market economy” (annex 2).
than before. Here is the first time that the private life of an individual is mentioned as something to feel proud of, but this individuality is never excluded of the collectiveness.

As during the previous period, the state and economy security are a priorities. Treason is heavily punished and the fact that according to the constitution criminals can be reformed and that any activity the government believes attempts against economic and state security, gives them a reason to clash those who's acts are against their principles (Art. 28, annex 2).

Moreover, in this period two other forms of identification are important: affiliations and roles. The first one is addressed as the private sector of the economy still isn’t and should not be the leading force in the growth of the economy. The public sector still is seen as a way to control the private sector (Arts.11 & 28). As for the second, it is important because it achieved an important change from the 1993 amendments. Even if in the preamble the Rising Power role is reassured when assuming Chinese economy still isn't developed, and that china's economy is not yet a source of pride and self esteem, there is a hint of wanting to become Great Power because of the turn to rule of law (Art. 5, annex 2). This means that there is no more radical permanent revolution, but a need for law and order. It is a slight turn to western and international values.

The dichotomies system that was stablished according to the analysis is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autobiographies</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>Individual/private economic life</th>
<th>Socialist and communist political thinking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collective/public life</td>
<td>Democratic and liberal political thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>State security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>State insecurity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliations</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collectove ownership of the land</td>
<td>Honor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>National territory</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Individual ownership of the land</td>
<td>Dishonor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Loyalty</td>
<td>Private economic sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All the dichotomies are based on the articles amended of the Constitution. To see which ones are refer to annex 2.

In summary, the identifications primed during this period are autobiographies. The state projects itself to the future based on the past, which is marked by the revolutionary struggle and the colonial past in order to, together with the new role, avoid foreign intervention. As shown with Deng, it is important to “update” the Communist principles. Also, the affiliations identification is primed as the state is reinforced as the leading force, and capitalist countries are not seen as enemies but with carefulness; however, in this period it can be said that the National Identity was not so determined by politics and doctrine, but by the economy. Lastly, in the constitution china isn’t seen yet as a Great Power but is gradually making a turn to see mainly its economy as a source of self esteem.

4.2.3. Tirth Period: 2000-2004

This period cannot be neglected despite its short length. The reason is because in this amendment twelve articles, one chapter and the preamble were revised. One important issue is the incorporation of the Three Representations of Jiang Zemin, which are just a way to enter into the preamble of the Constitution as Deng did in the past (difference is Deng was included after his death).

Here, once more the most comprised dimension is autobiographies. As mentioned above, another political leader thought, Jiang Zemin's, is being added. Also, in English at least, it seems like Chinese style socialist thinking precede the socialist

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34 The Party has always represented: (i) China’s developmental needs; (ii) The progressive direction of China’s advanced culture; (iii) The fundamental interest of the broad majority.
thinking (preamble, annex 2); then, China is writing a new story, one in which its superiority its revealed.

Another important change is the highlighting of a balance between political, economy and spiritual aspects (preamble, annex 2). Until here, the spiritual component has never been mentioned. Also in the preamble, patriotism is linked with communism; homeland is communism overall; patriotic Chinese are expected to advocate for socialism, are socialist and defend the integrity of the mother land.

Now, in this period is introduced the concept of “state of emergency” over the “martial law”. This change might seem as an improvement in the democratization of the use of force: the concept no longer revolves around the state figure but around the population. Does this mean that Chinese government wants to appeal to other democratic (“western”) countries by demonstrating they are not tyrants? This last idea is also linked with the Great Power role that is been assumed, as will be shown below.

The second set of identification most represented is bodies. In the preamble, the sentence “[...] and all patriots who stand for the reunification of the motherland” (annex 2) implies that the mother land (territory) is incomplete and should be reunited. The idea of recovering that what was taken from them permeates the overall feeling of the sentence, even more when linking it with patriotism. Then, Chinese people are seen by the government as a front which would fight for the motherland. In that sense to be a right Chinese, a patriotic one, the national must be a defender of socialism too.

Territorial integrity is shown as an important matter. It is constantly recalled that state’s land interests prevail over the private’s interest. When being on Chinese territory enterprises are subjected to state interests who have the right to expropriate land (however the compensation); state control over land is reaffirmed (art. 10, annex 2). Even if there is the right to a private property (Art. 13), and therefore it could be said also the right to a private life, it does not say it explicitly
and cannot be assumed. Then, private life is never acknowledged in the constitution. Also, important to highlight here is the recognition of minority nationalities (Art.59). With this, China accepts to defend foreigners in its territory.

Again, referring to State of emergency but now in this dimension, it can only be legally implemented in territories that are directly under the Central Government. Then, which situation does this put Hong Kong in? Then, is it still not recognized as a part of the whole territory in the constitution? Which implications does this have? Because Chinese government cannot enact lawfully their sovereignty on topics like security, within their land.

Parallely, in this amendment roles identifications are also important. Here, even if there still are vestiges of China’s role as a Rising Power, the attitude is turning towards the Great Power role and a greater self esteem. For example, there is a feeling of proudness because of how different Chinese style is from other forms of socialism (preamble, annex 2). Also, here is apparently given a warning as security is expected to increase as economic development continues to do so (Art.14); are they still a rising power? Or are they announcing their entrance as a great power?

As explained before, great powers must be willing and able to uphold the practices and core values of international society. Around this idea, when China declares that “the State respects and preserves human rights” (annex 2) it is trying to enter in the dynamics of great powers in an effort to don’t be delegitimized in the international society and by other states (especially other great powers). It is trying to socialize the most shared values among great powers (and the international society).

The dichotomies system that was established according to the analysis is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autobio-</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>Chinese socialism</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>Patriotism</th>
<th>State of emergency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>autobiographies</strong></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Marxist-Leninist socialism</td>
<td>Imbalance</td>
<td>Treason</td>
<td>Martial Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>National symbols</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other symbols</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bodies</strong></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Mother land</td>
<td>Patriotic</td>
<td>State land</td>
<td>Private rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Foreign land</td>
<td>Traitor</td>
<td>Private land</td>
<td>Public rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>State of emergency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Martial law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Roles</strong></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Chinese socialism</td>
<td>Economic development</td>
<td>Human rights protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Marxist-Leninist socialism</td>
<td>Development and insecurity</td>
<td>Humans rights violation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>State of emergency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Martial law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the dichotomies are based on the articles amended of the Constitution. To see which ones are refer to annex 2.

In summary, three identifications are being primed in this case: autobiographies, roles and bodies. The three seem to articulate around a sense of reaffirmation of China’s sovereignty and a regained proud. Also, it is emphasized that Chinese are expected to be the defenders of the land, but not its owners; state reaffirms its control over the land through Chinese socialism. In order to legitimize his role in the international society, they are appealing to western values and therefore could be said that there has been an acceptance of western countries as allies and not enemies. Lastly, China is announcing that its security measures (like armament) will increase as its economic capabilities increase. In that sense the economic and, in consequence, military capabilities are becoming a new source of self esteem.

**4.2.4. Fourth Period: 2005-2018**

This period is the one with the most amendments done to the Constitution, meaning that a huge political change took place. The dimension that could be most referenced in the amendments was roles (preamble Arts.1 & 89), then affiliations (preamble, Arts.1, 24 & 79) and last autobiographies (preamble & Art.1). In this revision is important to recall that a new Supervision Commission was created and
that the five-year term limits on the Presidency and Vice Presidency was eliminated.

Now, the first thing that appears to be in the preamble (annex 2) is that they keep appealing to western political values in order to gain more (or maintain) recognition and legitimacy in the international society; It is somehow trying aging to share western values to gain recognition. Also, the preamble is talking about turning China into a strong modern socialist country that is prosperous, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful. It was already emphasized that Great Powers had the duty of upholding the international order and must be willing and able to uphold the practices and core values of international society. This fragment of the preamble is targeting to the fulfillment of the duties of a Great Power.

As for their new role as Great Power, in the Article 1 the idea of a socialist system is changed by the idea of Socialism with Chinese characteristics. What is tried to be said is that they also have their own political model, a feature to be proud of. Another important move is that China commits with the building of an ecological civilization. In that sense, as mentioned before, China is integrating a global view on responsibility on climate in an attempt to fulfil duties expected of a Great Power. This might be seen as China accepting new responsibilities, ones of a more developed country.

Continuing with the dimension of affiliations, an important change took place in the preamble: Xi Jinping’s thinking is being added while he is still in power. This action aims to create a feeling of legitimation through fondness to his image; his the first leader to be introduced in the constitution before he leaves his political position. Also, as mentioned above, they keep appealing to western political values which draws a closer feeling to western nations. It is establishing a friendly approach to all countries regardless of their political or economic system. With this fragment of the preamble “in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural
exchanges with other countries and working to build a community with a shared future for mankind" (annex 2), it seems they want to be “friends” with everyone.

What does seem evident is the effort for increasing the affiliation for the communist party (as will be explain with autobiographies); the country should follow the core socialist values, and therefore their policy also follows those values. Also, the fact that the five-year term limits on the Presidency and Vice Presidency was eliminated is rewriting part of the democratization that was declared before. It seems like they are not backing up anymore on their own way of doing and seeing things. Before this period, they were trying to show up like a more reliable country to western values. Now it seems like they want to appeal for a friendly relationship but without giving up on their interests (as a great power would do).

Here the thinking of a new leader is added. However, this case is exceptional since it has been done while the leader is still in power. This way, his political power is expected to be reaffirmed. When saying that they aim "to realize the great rejuvenation for the Chinese nation", it is implying that the country is "old" and is in need for a more energized change (a change of generation). This tries to shift the loyalties of the people in order to turn to new generations. They are trying to say that it is been a long path to get where they are, and therefore they should be proud of their accomplishment since it hasn't been easy nor fast. It is also implying that the country is "old" and is in need for a change into a more energized change (probably implies a change of generation). This article for the first time writes the phrase “Communist Party of China”—and its “leadership”—into the main body of the Constitution. In absence of this article, the Party would be referenced only in the Preamble. Chinese scholars hold different views regarding whether and if so, to what extent, the Preamble has legal force. If one subscribes to the view that at least part of the Preamble has legal force, then this article only serves to reaffirm the Party’s domination of Chinese politics. If, however, one is of the opinion that the Preamble has no legal force whatsoever, then this article for the first time
constitutionalizes China’s status as a de facto one-party state, and will render any competitive multi-party system unconstitutional.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Strong modern socialist country</th>
<th>Socialist rule of law</th>
<th>Peaceful rise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak backward unjust country</td>
<td>liberal rule of law</td>
<td>Imperialist rise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>Mutual benefit</td>
<td>International Community</td>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Unilateral benefit</td>
<td>Individual state</td>
<td>Underdevelopment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliations</th>
<th>Socialist rule of law</th>
<th>Diplomatic relations</th>
<th>Socialism with Chinese characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>liberal rule of law</td>
<td>Conflictual relations</td>
<td>Other forms of socialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>Socialist values</td>
<td>Chinese political system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Western values</td>
<td>Western political system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autobiographies</th>
<th>New (thinking, economy, technologies, etc.)</th>
<th>Long history</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Old (thinking, economy, technologies, etc.)</td>
<td>Short history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>Socialism with Chinese characteristics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Other forms of socialism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the dichotomies are based on the articles amended of the Constitution. To see which ones are refer to annex 2.

Here is important to highlight the absence of reference to any form of identification that has to do with territory and people. The National identifications here doesn’t seem to focus that much on how people feel, but how the government (not even the state as an in the international society) fulfill its own targets. Here, the social (or popular) level of the National Identity gets missed.

4.3. What changed?

As seen above, changes did happen throughout the years in Chinese official National Identity. The main argument to this is that different identifications were primed every time the Constitution was being amended. A big change is that roles identifications didn’t started as important identifications in the first period, then became important in the second and third period, and by last in the fourth period became the most important form of identification.
From this it could be concluded that before becoming a Great Power, the role of China as a Rising Power was not a source of self esteem. Official National Identity didn’t aim to revolve around their attempts to become great, but around being great themselves.

Through the time, also affiliation identifications changed. At a first stage, as the dichotomies of the first period show national identifications focused on economic affiliations, sharing a better relationship with capitalism and economic western values. This quickly changed in the next period where affiliations turned towards political and ideological interests, narrowing the viewfinder of official identity to a sense of duty towards the country. However, it kept the sight over the importance of a private economy. Finally, in the last period this identifications returned without any hint of economic tint, focusing on inward ideological affiliations towards Chinese ways of being, and an introduction to a new diplomatic approach to state relations.

As for the autobiographies, it seems they are a strong source of official identifications but rarely change. This is mainly because of the ideological consistent history China. Since it is a one-party government, and after Deng Xiaoping there’s been relative political stability within the party, lectures on history haven’t changed drastically.

Now, bodies identifications have seemed to maintain in a rather secondary place, since government only needs to exploit identifications in territorial integrity, which have been always in the constitution (see preamble, ninth paragraph). However, in the third period, it did become an important identification. As shown in annex 1, during the period of 2000-2004 China increased its military expenditure arguing that it was aimed to discourage Taipei from declaring independence. This assertiveness towards Taiwan came after the 1999 NATO attack to the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. In that sense, territorial identifications only became important
when China was already a Great Power, and it felt its territorial integrity could be threatened.

**4.4. I Love Dollars**

Now, in order to find if official National Identity is the same to popular National Identity the second period is going to be approached through the novella, *I love Dollars*. In order to understand what gave birth to it, it cannot be ignored the centrality of the *open door policy*, which brought the massive entry of foreign cultural products.

With it, cultural matters such as the love between a man and a woman are recovered from the frigidity of the Cultural Revolution. "The mere expression of individual personal feelings, too, was something new and in complete contrast to the official, collective, political, and didactic ethos that prevailed in the popular songs of the revolutionary period" (Baranovitch, 2003, p.11). There was a change from collective to individual thinking, and the private life appeared.

It seemed like the power of the Party was weakening, phenomena that was associated with the rising influence of new technologies that entered the mainland when China opened to the outside world. “As state-controlled media ceased to monopolize the cultural sphere, their homogenizing effect, too, lost much of its previous impact” (ibid., p.13). Forces striving for a change and reform were gradually gaining more power than conservatives, because of the post-revolutionary ethos of disillusionment and political cynism that overtook after the Cultural Revolution.

Because of that, “a new political dynamic had emerged in China, namely, that large portions of society were now taking the liberty of not following official prescriptions” (ibid., p.16). This means that official identifications (including national identifications), stopped being blindly followed by the people during the first period.
During that period, there were two powerful (and sometimes opposite) forces that triggered the revival of creativity. One was the seeking and regain of a sense of collective identity rooted in a collective past. This took place with the Root-seeking movement, tied to an identity crisis that overtook China’s intellectuals in the early 1980’s. It seems that while Chinese [intellectuals] gained the private life, longed for the collective existence; this people longed for the past which became a desire object, unlike the official government assumption of future as bright and promising.

But there was also a portion of society who wanted to shake the bonds of tradition. There was a criticism and challenge against the loss of power, vitality, and virility in Chinese culture due to long lasting sociocultural and political oppression (ibid.). In that sense, there was a strong introduction to sexuality, which quickly became a typical subject of literary, musical and cinema works (Lovell, 2007 & Baranovitch, 2003).

Now, the background that gave birth to I love Dollars is one of “spiritual bankruptcy”. As Julia Lovell (2007) explains in the preface to her translation of the novel, the literary scene in China was going through a traumatic period were the intellectually elitist decade of the 80s was being rapidly replaced by the frenetic commercialism of the 1990s. Also, the cultural and intellectual outburst that characterized the 80s tragically concluded with the massacre of Tiananmen square. This novel is the child of a period were the pragmatism inlaid by Deng Xiaoping’s eagerness for economic surplus and profit, permeated the culture and ways of being:

Convinced that Communist China’s stability depended on the spread of material prosperity, he called for an end to ideological hang-ups about the capitalist nature of economic liberalization, and for an unleashing of market forces and encouragement of foreign investment in the interests of achieving "faster, better, deeper" economic growth. To the ever-pragmatic Deng, it was irrelevant whether the means were capitalist or socialist, provided that the end of preserving party rule was achieved: "It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white," he had argued years before. "So long as it catches mice, it's a good cat. (Lovell, 2007, para. 5)
As a result, *I love Dollars* (just by his name) turns out to be an ode to Deng Xiaoping’s directive to embrace capitalism (Lovell, 2007).

In it, an intergenerational dialogue between a father and his eldest son shows that the main way of identification in this work revolves around *autobiographies* (view annex 3). However, unlike official *autobiographies*, in the work “present” is not seen as a good thing, but it is expected that time will fix it.

In the dialogue between father and son, it is evident that the second believes the times of his father were much better than his, but not because of a nostalgic feeling of “any time gone by was better”, or the root-seeking nostalgia mentioned before, but because the son believes his father was a much more formidable sexual man: I realized father was a man with quite a libido, just that he was born a bit before his time. In his day, libido wasn't called libido, it was called idealism” (Wen, 2007, p.9).

With this, the author is that, contrary to the official identifications, past is not seen with pride or nostalgia (more examples on annex 4).

What does seem to be a central way of identification is *roles*. Here, the feeling of a rising power is not strong, but rather the feeling of an underdeveloped nation:

> I knew full well my tears were cheap, as were my emotions. I was a cheap person, in an age that burned to sell cheap, my natural habitat the clearance warehouse pushed carelessly to one end of a shelf, happy to write for anyone who tossed me a couple of coins. I was ready and waiting: I'd even put my soul on special, on 70, 80 percent discount. But don't forget I want to be paid in dollars-fucking dollars. (ibid., p.33)

Constantly in the novel, humanity is weighed by dollars. The protagonist no longer even thinks in *yuan* as the coin is strongly devalued against the dollar, and even when buying sex, it thinks of the women as in dollars (more examples on annex 5):

> Such a small thing: if there'd been dollar and not yuan signs on the bills sitting in my pocket, I'd have been all right. In Chinese, dollars are called mei yuan: beautiful, good yuan, better versions of our flawed renminbi selves. (ibid., p.44)
This novel shows that even if official national identifications were dealt through similar perspectives, popular identifications in the period of 1982-1995 were permeated by a sense of rotting, cynism, and general disillusionment. That being said, it is evident that during this time, the dialogue between official and popular identifications was broken.

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this investigation was not to propose anything beyond some interpretations of the Chinese National Identity. This attempt was made through linking different nodes which probably have not been connected before, around a topic not widely explored in International Relations.

Ned Lebow’s effort to explore further what is National Identity leaves various important points: 1) The relationship between identifications and behavior is by no means straightforward, and identifications are only one source of behavior. 2) It is more uncertain and complex than generally recognized in the constructivist literature. 3) In part, this is because there are multiple personal and national identifications that rise and fall in importance as a function of priming and context. 4) Any identification can have indeterminate implications for behavior because it usually lends itself to diverse readings. 5) To use identifications to explain or predict behavior we would need to know a lot more about when and how they form, the different ways people can understand the same identifications, and the conditions in which they turn to them for guidance. People act for many reasons that have nothing to do with their sense of who they are.

As for China, official National Identity did change in the constitution throughout time. Different forms of identifications were primed during periods between amendments and different ways of conceiving what was National Identity took place. However, at least for the period of 1982-1995, the dialogue between official and popular identifications was broken. This is due to animosity from the Cultural
Revolution and the Tiananmen violence tensioned the relationships between society and government.

Because of the language barrier, and the difficulties to acquire Chinese literature, this investigation was limited to only analyze a short period of the popular national identifications. This could have affected the final perception of the general relation of popular and official identifications. Also, deconstruction wasn’t fully developed in this work, and therefore the author exhorts other investigators to deepen both in more Chinese literature and National Identity, and in deconstruction as a methodology and a more critical view of National Identity in general.

Even if this investigation was done only around the case of China, the aim is also not to stagnate in the study of individual cases, but to broaden National Identity theory, and to develop a deeper theoretical framework around the centrality of a dialogue between society and government in the matter. Afterall, National Identity has become a way for the National and the International to interact, in a world that is being more and more globalized and connect.

Lastly, it should not be evaded the fact that National Identity is a form of internal colonization. Since, as mentioned in this investigation official National Identity is the one that prevails, in authoritarian states, and even worst, not authoritarian states behind a mask of legitimacy under democracy, can systematically eliminate or ignore other ways of national (and not national) identifications. In that sense, it is important to improve efforts around the understanding of the value and centrality of National Identity as a collective construction, even more nowadays that migration flows are huge, that multicultural and multiethnic countries are expanding, and that globalization can affect ancestral indigenous communities like in the cases of Latin America and Asia.
REFERENCES


### ANNEXES

For an easier access to the annexes 1, 2 & 3, refer to the following link:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1jT4T79MJ6_8D94NTe8hkDj8C74FES3LS0XY4_3PN2Cc/edit?usp=sharing

1. **Year** | **Political Event** | **Crucial identity junctures** | **Identity trajectory** | **Consitution** | **International-Chinese events**
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
1976 | Mao Tse Tung dies | | | | |
1982 | Twelfth CCP Congress | | | New Constitution | |
1985 | Free higher education is abolished and replaced by academic scholarships based on academic ability | | | | |
1986-1990 | China’s “Open-door policy” opens the country to foreign investment and encourages development of a market economy and private sector | | | | |
1987 | Hu Yaobang is forced to resign to the presidency of the CCP (because is too “liberal”) | | | | |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Amended: (Art. 11) the private sector of the economy can exist and develop within the limits prescribed by law, complementing (&quot;a complement of the&quot;) the &quot;socialist public economy&quot; (1)(2). (Art. 10.4) rights to the use of land can be transferred according to law (2) (to privates, be it citizens or enterprises).</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>Hu Yaobang dies. Tiananmen Square movement (demand of posthumous rehabilitation of former CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang).</td>
<td>Jiang Zemin becomes CCP head because Zhao Ziyang (former general secretary), refused to support martial law during the Tiananmen demonstrations. June: Crack down of Tiananmen Square demonstrations with military power (official death toll: 200). Hachette Filipacchi starts to publish a Chinese version of the fashion magazine &quot;Elle&quot;. (feminity).</td>
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<td>The European Council of Ministers agrees to an EU-wide arms embargo against China.</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>Falun Gong religious movement founded by Li Hongzhi from Changchun, Jilin province.</td>
<td>Russia and China sign declaration restoring friendly ties. China ratifies the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) ranks China's economy as third largest in the world after the US and Japan.</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td><strong>Jiang Zemin becomes President of the PRC // Eighth National People's Congress</strong></td>
<td>Preliminary construction work on the Three Gorges dam begins. It will create a lake almost 600 kilometres (375 miles) long and submerge dozens of cultural heritage sites by the time it is completed in 2009. Amended: introduction of the concept of &quot;socialist market economy&quot; in the preamble (1), and introduction of the idea of &quot;the primary stage of socialism&quot; (socialist modernization along the socialist road with Chinese characteristics (2). Planned economy provisions are deleted (Arts. 15, 16, 17), and replaced by the notions of &quot;socialist market economy&quot; and &quot;macro regulation&quot;. The term &quot;People's Commune&quot; is deleted, and the system of collective ownership changed into the household responsibility system. (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>China connected to NSFNET (Internet)</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>China tests missiles and holds military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, apparently to intimidate Taiwan during its presidential elections.</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - dubbed the Shanghai Five - meet in Shanghai and agree to cooperate to combat ethnic and religious tensions in each others' countries.</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>Deng Xiaoping dies</td>
<td>Rioting erupts in Yining, Xinjiang and on day of Deng's funeral Xinjiang separatists plant three bombs on buses in Urumqi, Xinjiang, killing nine and injuring 74. Hong Kong reverts to Chinese control</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>Zhu Rongji succeeds Li Peng as premier</td>
<td>About four million civil service jobs to be axed.</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>Ninth National People's Congress. Fiftieth anniversary of People's Republic of China on 1st October</td>
<td>The Falun Gong movement is declared illegal in China and a threat to national security. Amended: preamble, mention of Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaopeng, Marx, Lenin and Mao (1). Reafirmation of the primary stage of socialism (Art.6). The status of the private sector is elevated from &quot;a compliment&quot; (1988) to the &quot;important constituent component&quot; of the socialist market economy (Art.11) (2). Change from &quot;counter revolutionary activities&quot; punishable by the state, to &quot;unlawful activities that harm the state security&quot; (Art. 28). Declaration that China is committed to &quot;administration of the state according to law&quot;, and construction of a &quot;socialist rule of law state&quot; (Art.5).</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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<td>Diplomatic stand-off over the detention of an American spy plane and crew after a mid-air collision with a Chinese fighter jet. // Leaders of China, Russia and four Central Asian states launch the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and sign an agreement to fight ethnic and religious militancy while promoting trade and investment // China carries out military exercises simulating an invasion of Taiwan, at the same time as the island's armed forces test their capability to defend Taiwan against a missile attack from China. // CHINA JOINS THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>Transition from Jiang to Hu Jintao. Hu becomes General Secretary of the Communist Party (2002), and President of the People's Republic of China (2003).</td>
<td>US President George W Bush visits, on the 30th anniversary of President Nixon's visit to China // The US says China is modernising its military to make possible a forcible reunification with Taiwan. Beijing says its policy remains defensive.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event 1</td>
<td>Event 2</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>Some 500,000 people march in Hong Kong against Article 23, a controversial anti-subversion bill. Two key Hong Kong government officials resign. The government shelves the bill.</td>
<td>Launch of China's first manned spacecraft.</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Hu becomes president of the Central Military Comission</td>
<td>Amended: preamble, incorporation of the Three Representations of Jiang Zemin &lt;&lt;The Party has always represented: (i) China's developmental needs; (ii) The progressive direction of China's advanced culture; (iii) The fundamental interest of the broad majority.&gt;&gt; (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Former reformist leader Zhao Ziyang dies. He opposed violent measures to end 1989's student protests and spent his last years under virtual house arrest.</td>
<td>Relations with Japan deteriorate amid sometimes-violent anti-Japanese protests in Chinese cities, sparked by a Japanese textbook which China says glosses over Japan's World War II record</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Work on the structure of the Three Gorges Dam, the world's largest hydropower project, is completed. Government says pollution has degraded China's environment to a critical level, threatening health and social stability.</td>
<td>New law on Taiwan calls for use of force should Taipei declare independence from mainland China. // Relations with Japan deteriorate amid sometimes-violent anti-Japanese protests in Chinese cities, sparked by a Japanese textbook which China says glosses over Japan's World War II record. // Taiwan's Nationalist Party leader Lien Chan visits China for the first meeting between Nationalist and Communist Party leaders since 1949. // China and Russia hold their first joint military exercises.</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>New labour law introduced after</td>
<td>African heads of state gather for a China-Africa summit in Beijing. Business deals worth nearly $2bn are signed and China promises billions of dollars in loans and credits.</td>
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</table>

(1) The Three Representations of Jiang Zemin: The Party has always represented: (i) China's developmental needs; (ii) The progressive direction of China's advanced culture; (iii) The fundamental interest of the broad majority.
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Text</th>
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<th>Text</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Eleventh NPC opens</td>
<td>Anti-China protests escalate into the worst violence Tibet has seen in 20 years, five months before Beijing hosts the Olympic Games.</td>
<td>Beijing hosts Olympic Games</td>
<td>Pro-Tibet activists in several countries focus world attention on the region by disrupting progress of the Olympic torch relay. // Japan and China reach a deal for the joint development of a gas field in the East China Sea, resolving a four-year-old dispute. // China and Russia sign a treaty ending 40-year-old border dispute which led to armed clashes during the Cold War // China and Taiwan agree to set up offices in each other's territory.</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>Scores of people are killed and hundreds injured in the worst ethnic violence in decades as a protest in the restive Xinjiang region turns violent. Six men are sentenced to death for involvement in ethnic violence in Xinjiang.</td>
<td>First sign of relaxation of strictly enforced one-child policy</td>
<td>China executes Briton Akmal Shaikh for drug dealing, despite pleas for clemency from the British government.</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jailed Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo is awarded Nobel Peace Prize, prompting official protests from Beijing.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The US calls on Beijing to investigate the cyber attacks, saying China has tightened censorship. China condemns US criticism of its internet controls. The web giant Google ends its compliance with Chinese internet censorship and starts re-directing web searches to a Hong Kong, in response to cyber attacks on e-mail accounts of human rights activists. // Diplomatic row erupts over Japan's arrest of Chinese trawler crew in disputed waters in East China Sea. Japan later</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>Police kill seven Uighurs suspected of being behind separate attacks in the towns of Horan and Kashgar blamed on separatists. // Southern fishing village of Wukan comes to international attention after violent protests by locals against land seizures by officials.</td>
<td>frees the crew but rejects Chinese demands for an apology.</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>China issues new rules requiring users of microblogs to register personal details.</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>Arrest of Chinese artist and activist Ai Weiwei for “economic crimes” sparks international campaign for his release. He is freed after more than two months' detention.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Police kill seven Uighurs suspected of being behind separate attacks in the towns of Horan and Kashgar blamed on separatists. // Southern fishing village of Wukan comes to international attention after violent protests by locals against land seizures by officials.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>China issues new rules requiring users of microblogs to register personal details.</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>Philippines and Chinese naval vessels confront one another off the Scarborough Shoal reef in the South China Sea. Both countries claim the reef, which may have significant reserves of oil and gas. // China cancels ceremonies to mark the 40th anniversary of restored diplomatic ties with Japan because of a public flare-up over disputed islands in the East China Sea.</td>
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<td>2012-2013</td>
<td>Transition from Hu to Xi Jinping</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Two ethnic Uighur men are sentenced to death over clashes in Xinjiang in April that left 21 people dead</td>
<td>mounting tension over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea.</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>Other reforms include the abolition of &quot;re-education through labour&quot; camps.</td>
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<td>2015</td>
<td>The Communist Party announces it has decided to end the decades-old one-child policy.</td>
<td>China's President Xi Jinping and Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou hold historic talks in Singapore</td>
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<td>2017</td>
<td>Communist Party votes at its congress to enshrine Xi Jinping's name and ideology in its constitution, elevating him to the level as founder Mao Zedong.</td>
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<td>2017</td>
<td>The government passes a new cyber security law, giving it more control over the data of foreign and domestic firms.</td>
<td>President Xi urges trade cooperation with the US at his first official meeting with US President Donald Trump in Florida // Row with India over disputed area of Himalayas, where China says Indian troops were trespassing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>National People's Congress annual legislative meeting votes to remove a two-term limit on</td>
<td>21 articles amended.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>President Xi urges trade cooperation with the US at his first official meeting with US President Donald Trump in Florida // Row with India over disputed area of Himalayas, where China says Indian troops were trespassing.</td>
<td>trade tariffs on US products in response for US tariffs on Chinese products</td>
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the presidency from the constitution, allowing Xi Jinping to remain in office for longer than the conventional decade for recent Chinese leaders.


Data with no number assigned


2. AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>Modification on</th>
<th>Original</th>
<th>Modification</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Dicotomies</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Article 11</td>
<td>include a new paragraph</td>
<td>&quot;The State permits the private sector of the economy to exist and develop within the limits prescribed by law. The private sector of the economy is a complement to the socialist public economy. The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the private sector of the economy, and exercises guidance, supervision and control over the private sector of the economy.&quot;</td>
<td>Affiliations</td>
<td>Friendship with the private sector (national and international)</td>
<td>private sector/public sector</td>
<td>The public sector is seen as a way to control the private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Article 10, paragraph 4</td>
<td>&quot;No organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or lease land or otherwise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful means&quot;</td>
<td>amended as</td>
<td>Autobiographies</td>
<td>political and economic interests</td>
<td>private use of land/collective use of land</td>
<td>Here is introduced for the first time the idea of a private (and individual) use of the land. This is the first bite of a new gained private life.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Affiliations | Hostility | State/private property | The state as a mean of regulation precedes the natural person and the legal person. |
1993 Preamble, seventh paragraph

"The basic task of the nation in the years to come is to concentrate its effort on socialist modernization. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and follow the socialist road, steadily improve socialist institutions, develop socialist democracy, improve the socialist legal system and work hard and self-reliantly to modernize industry, agriculture, national defense and science and technology step by step to turn China into a socialist country with a high level of culture and democracy"

amended as

"China is at the primary stage of socialism. The basic task of the nation is, according to the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, to concentrate its effort on socialist modernization. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and follow the socialist road, persevere in reform and opening to the outside, steadily improve socialist institutions, develop socialist democracy, improve the socialist legal system and work hard and self-reliantly to modernize industry, agriculture, national defense and science and technology step by step to turn China into a socialist country with prosperity and power, democracy and culture."

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<tr>
<th>Bodies</th>
<th>People and territory</th>
<th>Chineseness/national territory</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Amendments: China is at the primary stage of socialism. The basic task of the nation is, according to the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, to concentrate its effort on socialist modernization. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and follow the socialist road, persevere in reform and opening to the outside, steadily improve socialist institutions, develop socialist democracy, improve the socialist legal system and work hard and self-reliantly to modernize industry, agriculture, national defense and science and technology step by step to turn China into a socialist country with prosperity and power, democracy and culture.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Affiliations</th>
<th>socialism/liberalism inside/outside</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autobiographies</th>
<th>soberanía/colonialismo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>They are projected into the future based on the past &lt;&lt; we are Marxist Leninist Maoists &gt;&gt;. One projects in the future based on the past, this past is marked by the revolutionary struggle and the colonial past in order to, together with the new role, avoid foreign intervention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Rising Power</th>
<th>National sovereignty/foreign intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>modernize industry, agriculture, national defense and science and technology step by step to turn China into a socialist country with prosperity and power, democracy and culture.&quot; (todo esto se hace en función convertir a china en una potencia great power, con el fin de evitar intervención extranjera y deslegitimación internacional) No quieren que intervengan en su riqueza, en su poder interno y externo, en su régimen político (por eso dicen democracia) y con nuestra cultura (nuestra forma de ser). (la</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preamble, tenth paragraph</td>
<td><strong>In building socialism it is essential to rely on workers, peasants and intellectuals and to unite all forces that can be united. In the long years of revolution and construction, there has been formed under the leadership of the Communist Party of China a broad patriotic united front which is composed of the democratic parties and people's organizations and which embraces all socialist working people, all builders of socialism, all patriots who support socialism, and all patriots who stand for the reunification of the motherland. This united front will continue to be consolidated and developed. The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a broadly based representative organization of the united front which has played a significant historical role, will play a still more important role in the country's political and social life, in promoting friendship with other countries and in the struggle for socialist modernization and for the reunification and unity of the country. The system of the multi-party cooperation and political consultation led by the Communist Party of China will exist and develop for a long time to come.</strong></td>
<td><strong>add</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 7</td>
<td><strong>&quot;The State economy is the sector of socialist economy under ownership by the whole people; it is the leading force in the national economy. The State ensures the consolidation and growth of the State economy.&quot;</strong></td>
<td><strong>changed to</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliations</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>&quot;Hostility&quot; (is not hostility but cautiousness)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State own economy/economy</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>The private sector of the economy is not and should not be the leading force in the growth of the economy. Therefore, the state reassert it predominance over other economic actors (private</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the national identity what should prevail is the state. Even if economy is said to be owned by the whole people, state controls this economy; the state own enterprises respond to the state, not the people. Economy exists first for the benefit of the state, then people.

**Article 8, first item**

"Rural people’s communes, agricultural producers’ cooperatives, and other forms of cooperative economy such as producers’, supply and marketing, credit and consumers’ cooperatives, belong to the sector of socialist economy under collective ownership by the working people. Working people who are members of rural economic collectives have the right, within the limits prescribed by law, to farm plots of cropland and hilly land allotted for private use, engage in household sideline production and raise privately-owned livestock."

amended as

"Rural household-based contract responsibility system with remuneration linked to output, and other forms of cooperative economy such as producers’, supply and marketing, credit and consumers’ cooperatives, belong to the sector of socialist economy under collective ownership by the working people. Working people who are members of rural economic collectives have the right, within the limits prescribed by law, to farm plots of cropland and hilly land allotted for private use, engage in household sideline production and raise privately-owned livestock."

**Article 15**

"The State practices economic planning on the basis of socialist public ownership. It ensures the proportionate and coordinated growth of the national economy through overall balancing by economic planning and the supplementary role of regulation by the market. // Disturbance of the orderly functioning of the social economy or disruption of the State economic plan by any organization or individual is prohibited."

changed to

The State practises socialist market economy. // The State strengthens economic legislation, improves macro-regulation and control. // The State prohibits in accordance with law any organization or individual from disturbing the socio-economic order.
Article 16
“State enterprises have decision-making power in operation and management within the limits prescribed by law, on condition that they submit to unified leadership by the State and fulfill and their obligations under the State plan. State enterprises practice democratic management through congresses of workers and staff and in other ways in accordance with the law.”

revised as
“Stated-owned enterprises have decision-making power in operation and management within the limits prescribed by law. State-owned enterprises practice democratic management through congresses of workers and staff and in other ways in accordance with the law.”

democratic economy/restrictive economy (private and, especially, foreign enterprises).

When appealing to democratic practices in the economy, they appeal to economies that function under the same principles, especially because this ensures their autonomy of Chinese political matters.

Article 17
“Collective economic organizations have decision-making power in conducting independent economic activities, on condition that they accept the guidance of the State plan and abide by the relevant laws. Collective economic organizations practice democratic management in accordance with the law, with the entire body of their workers electing or removing their managerial personnel and deciding on major issues concerning operation and management.”

amended as
Collective economic organizations have decision-making power in conducting independent economic activities, on condition that they abide by the relevant laws. Collective economic organizations practice democratic management and, in accordance with law, elect or remove their managerial personnel and decide on major issues concerning operation and management.

democratic economy/industrial economy

Article 42, third paragraph
“Work is the glorious duty of every able-bodied citizen. All working people in State enterprises and in urban and rural economic collectives should perform their tasks with an attitude consonant with their status as masters of the country. The State promotes socialist labor emulation, and commends and rewards model and advanced workers. The state encourages citizens to take part in voluntary labor.”

amended as
Work is a matter of honour for every citizen who is able to work. All working people in State-owned enterprises and in urban and rural economic collectives should approach their work as the masters of the country that they are. The State promotes socialist labour emulation, and commends and rewards model and advanced workers. The State encourages citizens to take part in voluntary labour.

Bodies People honor/dishonor

Chinese people is portrayed as a hard working honored person. This article also portrays that the ideal Chinese according to the State is that who works hard in the name of the country and takes its place as the master of it; state urge people to fulfill their role (which can be associated to confucianism)

Article 98
“The term of office of the people’s congresses of provinces, municipalities directly under the Central Government and cities divided into districts is five years. The term of office of the people’s congresses of provinces, municipalities directly under the Central Government, counties, cities and municipal districts is five years. The term of office of the people’s congresses of townships, ...

revised as
“The term of office of the people’s congresses of provinces, municipalities directly under the Central Government, counties, cities and municipal districts is five years. The term of office of the people’s congresses of townships,

// // // //
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 5</th>
<th>The State upholds the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal system. // No laws or administrative or local regulations may contravene the Constitution. // All State organs, the armed forces, all political parties and state-owned enterprises must be subject to the law.</th>
<th>Added at the beginning</th>
<th>The People's Republic of China practices ruling the country in accordance with law and building a socialist country of law.</th>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Great Power(?)</th>
<th>rule of law/anomy</th>
<th>No more permanent revolution, but a need for law and order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preamble, paragraph 7</td>
<td>&quot;The victory in China's New-Democratic Revolution and the successes in its socialist cause have been achieved by the Chinese people of all nationalities, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, by upholding truth, correcting errors and surmounting numerous difficulties and hardships. China is at the primary stage of socialism. The basic task of the nation is to concentrate its effort on socialist modernization in line with the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist road, persevere in reform and opening to the outside world, steadily improve socialist institutions, develop socialist democracy, improve the socialist legal system and work hard and self-reliantly to modernize the country's industry, agriculture, national defence and science and technology step by step to turn China into a socialist country that is prosperous, powerful, democratic and culturally advanced.&quot;</td>
<td>revised as</td>
<td>&quot;The victory in China's New-Democratic Revolution and the successes in its socialist cause have been achieved by the Chinese people of all nationalities, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, by upholding truth, correcting errors and surmounting numerous difficulties and hardships. China will be in the primary stage of socialism for a long time to come. The basic task of the nation is to concentrate its effort on socialist modernization along the road of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist road, persevere in reform and opening to the outside world, steadily improve socialist institutions, develop the socialist market economy, develop socialist democracy, improve the socialist legal system and work hard and self-reliantly to modernize the country's industry, agriculture, national defence and science and technology step by step to turn China into a socialist country that is prosperous, powerful, democratic and culturally advanced.&quot;</td>
<td>Autobiographies</td>
<td>Political end on loyalty and camaraderie</td>
<td>Socialist and communist political thinking/democratic and liberal political thinking</td>
<td>strong market economy/weak market economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Article 6</strong></td>
<td><strong>Article 11</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;The basis of the socialist economic system of the People's Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working people. This system supersedes the system of exploitation of man by man; it applies the principle of &quot;from each according to his ability, to each according to his work.&quot;&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;The State permits the private sector of the economy to exist and develop within the limits prescribed by law. The private sector of the economy is a complement to the socialist public economy. The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the private sector of the economy, and exercises guidance, supervision and control over the private sector of the economy.&quot;</td>
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<td>revised as</td>
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<tr>
<td>The basis of the socialist economic system of the People's Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working people. This system supersedes the system of exploitation of man by man; it applies the principle of &quot;from each according to his ability, to each according to his work.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Individual private and other non-public economies that exist within the limits prescribed by law are major components of the socialist market economy.&quot; The State protects the lawful rights and interests of individuals and private economies, and guides, supervises and administers individual and private economies.</td>
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<td>Bodies</td>
<td>Autobiographies</td>
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<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>political (and economic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>socialist working system/ exploitation of man by man</td>
<td>mean of individuality</td>
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<td></td>
<td>individula, private life/ collective public life</td>
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<td>Here is added the individual aspect of the economy. Now individualism enters to be a part of chinese people imaginary. The fact that the government is willing to defend their right to indiviual private property shares a feeling on limited liberty, but still some more individual liberty. Here is the first time is mentioned the appearence of the privite individula life. But individuality is not excluding of the collectivness.</td>
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<td>Affiliation</td>
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<td>Friendship with the private sector (national and international)</td>
<td>Friendship with the private sector (national and international)</td>
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<td>private economic sector/public economic sector</td>
<td>private economic sector/public economic sector</td>
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<td>The public sector still is seen as a way to control the private sector</td>
<td>The public sector still is seen as a way to control the private sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Article 28</td>
<td>&quot;The State maintains public order and suppresses treasonable and other counter-revolutionary activities; it penalizes actions that endanger public security and disrupt the socialist economy and other criminal activities, and punishes and reforms criminals.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;The State maintains public order and suppresses treasonable and other criminal activities that endanger State security; it penalizes actions that endanger public security and disrupt the socialist economy and other criminal activities, and punishes and reforms criminals.&quot;</td>
<td>Affiliation</td>
<td>Autobiographies</td>
<td>political mean ---&gt; sense of coercion (?)</td>
<td>state security/state security threats</td>
<td>state and economy security is a priority. Treason is heavily punished and the fact that criminals can be reformed and that any activity the government believes attempts against economic and state security, gives them a reason to clash those who's acts are against their principles.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preamble, seventh paragraph</td>
<td>&quot;under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents&quot;</td>
<td>Affiliation</td>
<td>Autobiographies</td>
<td>Loyalty</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>Another political leader, Jiang Zemin's, is being added.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>&quot;along the road of building socialism with Chinese characteristics&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;along the road of Chinese-style socialism&quot;</td>
<td>Roles</td>
<td>Autobiographies</td>
<td>Starting to construct prouderness (loyalty and solidarity)</td>
<td>chinese socialism/Marxist-Leninist socialism</td>
<td>feeling of prouderness because of how different Chinese style is from other forms of socialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preamble, tenth paragraph</td>
<td>&quot;to modernize the country's industry, agriculture, national defence and science and technology step by step&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;and promote the coordinated development of the material, political and spiritual civilizations&quot;</td>
<td>added after autobiographies</td>
<td>Political mean ---&gt; gather what the past can offer to the present, what can be useful</td>
<td>balance/unbalance</td>
<td>It is highlighting the importance of a balance between politics, economy and spiritual aspects. Until here it was never mentioned the spiritual component.</td>
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<td>revised as</td>
<td>revised as</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bodies</td>
<td>Territories</td>
<td>mother land/foreign land</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>The mother land is incomplete ... yet</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 10, Third paragraph</td>
<td>“The State may, in the public interest, requisition land for its use in accordance with the law.”</td>
<td>revised as</td>
<td>“The State may, in the public interest and in accordance with the provisions of law, expropriate or requisition land for its use and shall make compensation for the land expropriated or requisitioned.”</td>
<td>Bodies</td>
<td>Territories</td>
<td>state land/private land</td>
<td>People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 11, Second paragraph</td>
<td>“The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the individual and private sectors of the economy, and exercises guidance, supervision and control over individual and the private sectors of the economy.”</td>
<td>revised as</td>
<td>“The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the non-public sectors of the economy such as the individual and private sectors of the economy. The State encourages, supports and guides the development of the non-public sectors of the economy and, in accordance with law, exercises supervision and control over the non-public sectors of the economy.”</td>
<td>Affiliations</td>
<td>friendship</td>
<td>public sector of the economy/non-public sector of the economy</td>
<td>State land interests prevails over the private’s. Over Chinese territory enterprises are subjected to state interests (however the compensation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 13</td>
<td>“The State protects the right of citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses and other lawful property.” and “The State protects according to law the right of citizens to inherit private property.”</td>
<td>revised as</td>
<td>“Citizens’ lawful private property is inviolable” and “The State, in accordance with law, protects the rights of citizens to private property and to its inheritance”</td>
<td>Bodies</td>
<td>territory</td>
<td>private rights/public rights</td>
<td>Right to a private property. One could say also the right to a private life then, but it does not says it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 14</td>
<td>added</td>
<td>“The State establishes a sound social security system compatible with the level of economic development.”</td>
<td>roles</td>
<td>Rising Power? Great Power?</td>
<td>economic development/und development/insecurity</td>
<td>Security will increase as economic development continues to do so (are they still a rising power? or are they announcing their entrance as a great power?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 33</td>
<td>added</td>
<td>“The State respects and preserves human rights.”</td>
<td>Roles</td>
<td>Great Power</td>
<td>human rights protection/human rights violations</td>
<td>&quot;Great powers must be willing and able to uphold the practices and core”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 59, The first paragraph</td>
<td>&quot;The National People's Congress is composed of deputies elected from the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government and of deputies elected from the armed forces. All the minority nationalities are entitled to appropriate representation.&quot;</td>
<td>revised as</td>
<td>&quot;The National People's Congress is composed of deputies elected from the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government, and the special administrative regions, and of deputies elected from the armed forces. All the minority nationalities are entitled to appropriate representation.&quot;</td>
<td>Bodies</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>minority nationalities/chinese nationality</td>
<td>What is important to highlight here is the recognition of minority nationalities. Then, China recognizes that it is accepting defending foreigners in its territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 67, Subparagraph 20</td>
<td>&quot;... to decide on the imposition of martial law throughout the country or in particular provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly under the Central Government.&quot;</td>
<td>revised as</td>
<td>&quot;... to decide on entering the state of emergency throughout the country or in particular provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly under the Central Government.&quot;</td>
<td>Bodies</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>State of emergency can only be legally implemented in territories that are directly under the Central Government. Where does this put Hong Kong? Then, is it still not recognized as a part of the whole territory in the constitution. Which implications does this have? Because Chinese government cannot enact lawfully their intention of controlling on topics like security, their land.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 80</td>
<td>&quot;The President of the People's Republic of China ... proclaims martial law, ...&quot;</td>
<td>revised as</td>
<td>&quot;... proclaims entering of the state of emergency, ...&quot;</td>
<td>Roles</td>
<td>Great Power</td>
<td>This change might seem as an improvement in the democratization of the use of force. It no longer revolves around the state but around the population. Do you want to appeal to</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Original</td>
<td>Revised</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Article 81, Subparagraph 11</td>
<td>&quot;The President of the People's Republic of China receives foreign diplomatic representatives on behalf of the People's Republic of China.&quot;</td>
<td>revised as &quot;The President of the People's Republic of China, on behalf of the People's Republic of China, engages in activities involving State affairs and receives foreign diplomatic representatives.&quot;</td>
<td>democratization, Solidarity with the state (?) other countries when demonstrating they are not tyrannas (?)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Article 98</td>
<td>&quot;The term of office of people's congresses of provinces, municipalities directly under the Central Government, counties, cities and municipal districts is five years. The term of office of the people's congresses of townships, nationality townships and towns is three years.&quot;</td>
<td>revised as &quot;The term of office of the local people's congresses at various levels is five years.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Title of Chapter IV</td>
<td>&quot;The National Flag, the National Emblem and the Capital&quot;</td>
<td>revised as &quot;The National Flag, the National Anthem, the National Emblem and the Capital&quot;</td>
<td>Autobiographies Political mean on loyalty national symbols/other symbols</td>
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<tr>
<td>Article 136</td>
<td>&quot;The national flag of the People’s Republic of China is a red flag with five stars.&quot;</td>
<td>added &quot;The National Anthem of the People's Republic of China is the March of the Volunteers.&quot;</td>
<td>Autobiographies Political mean on loyalty</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preamble, paragraph seventh</td>
<td>&quot;the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents&quot;</td>
<td>amended &quot;the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development, and the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era&quot;</td>
<td>Autobiographies Political mean on loyalty</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| | "improve the socialist legal system" | replaced by, and added after "improve the socialist rule of law", "apply a new vision of development" | Affiliate
cship friendship socialist rule of law/democratic rule of law |
| | "promote the coordinated development of the material, political and spiritual" | amended "promote the coordinated development of the material, political, spiritual, social and economic aspects" | Roles Great Power |

Here the thinking of a new leader is added. However this case is exceptional since it has been done while the leader is still in power. This way his power is tried to be reaffirmed, as the thinking is being added while Xi Jinping is still in power, the action aims to create a feeling of legitimation through fondness.

They keep appealing to western political values in order to gain more (or maintain) recognition and legitimacy in the international society.

It is somehow trying aging to share western values to...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preamble, paragraph tenth</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;China consistently carries out an independent foreign policy and adheres to the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;follows a path of peaceful development, and pursues a mutually beneficial strategy of opening up&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;In the long years of revolution, construction, and reform&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&quot;In the long years of revolution and construction&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;In the long years of revolution, construction, and reform&quot;</th>
<th>Autobiographies</th>
<th>Political mean on solidarity</th>
<th>Long history/short history</th>
<th>They are trying to say that it has been a long path to get where they are, and therefore they should be</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;China consistently carries out an independent foreign policy and adheres to the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;follows a path of peaceful development, and pursues a mutually beneficial strategy of opening up&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;In the long years of revolution, construction, and reform&quot;</td>
<td>Autobiographies</td>
<td>Political mean on solidarity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| "China consistently carries out an independent foreign policy and adheres to the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence" | "follows a path of peaceful development, and pursues a mutually beneficial strategy of opening up" | "in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries" | "In the long years of revolution, construction, and reform" | Autobiographies | Political mean on solidarity | Long history/short history | They are trying to say that it has been a long path to get where they are, and therefore they should be |
| Article 1, paragraph 2 | "[The socialist system is the basic system of the People's Republic of China."
| inserts after | "The defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China."
| Autobiographies | Political mean on loyalty |

**Amended:**

"which embraces all socialist working people, all builders of socialism, all patriots who support socialism, and all patriots who stand for the reunification of the motherland and endeavor to revitalize the Chinese nation".

Autobiographies

Political mean on loyalty

old (thinking, economy, technologies, etc)/new (thinking, economy, technologies, etc)

time implying that the country is "old" and is in need for a change into a more energized change (probably implies a change of generation). This tries to shift the loyalties of the people in order to turn to new generations.

"[This article for the first time writes the phrase “Communist Party of China”—and its "leadership"—into the main body of the Constitution. Absent this article, the Party is referenced only in the Preamble. Chinese scholars hold different views regarding whether and if so, to what extent, the Preamble has legal force. If one subscribes to the view that at least part of the Preamble has legal force, then this article only serves to reaffirm the Party's domination of Chinese politics. If, however, one is of the opinion that the Preamble has no legal force whatsoever, then this article for the first time constitutionalizes China's status as a de facto one-party state, and will render..."
Article 3
“All administrative, adjudicatory and procuratorial organs of the State are created by the people’s congresses to which they are responsible and by which they are supervised.”

Amended
“All administrative, supervision, adjudicatory and procuratorial organs of the State are created by the people’s congresses to which they are responsible and by which they are supervised.”

Roles
Great Power

Affiliations
//

Article 4
“The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops a relationship of equality, unity, mutual assistance, and harmony among all of China’s nationalities.”

Amended
“The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops a relationship of equality, unity, mutual assistance, and harmony among all of China’s nationalities.”

Bodies
People
Harmony among Chinese people/ostility

Affiliations
//

Article 24
“The State advocates the civic virtues of love of the motherland, of the people, of labor, of science and of socialism”

Amended
“The State champions core socialist values and advocates the civic virtues of love of the motherland, of the people, of labor, of science and of socialism.”

Affiliations
Respect and appreciation towards the communist party and the socialist model, social values/western values

Bodies
//

Article 27
A new paragraph is added
“State functionaries shall take a public oath of allegiance to the Constitution when assuming office.”

Roles
//

Affiliations
//

Article 62
“The National People’s Congress exercises the following functions and powers”

Added
“(7) to elect the Chairperson of the State Supervision Commission,”

Roles
//

Affiliations
//

Article 63
“The National People’s Congress has the power to remove from office the following persons”

Added
“(4) the Chairperson of the State Supervision Commission,”

Roles
//

Affiliations
//

Article 65
“No one on the Standing Committee of”

Amended
“No one on the Standing Committee of the

Roles
//

Affiliations
//

because of the context, harmony seems like a spiritual concept, therefore the association with confucianism. Beyond that, this is trying to advocate for a relationship of camaraderie, solidarity and fulfillment of their own purpose in society. Its saying that Chinese should “coexist” and live together with other chinese even when not agreeing with them(?).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>New Clause</th>
<th>Old Clause</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Affiliations</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 67</td>
<td>&quot;(6) to supervise the work of the State Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;(6) to supervise the work of the State Council, the Central Military Commission, the State Supervision Commission, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate&quot;</td>
<td>Great Power(?)</td>
<td>loyalty</td>
<td>chinese political system/western political system</td>
<td>This is rewriting part of the democratization that was declared before. It seems like they are not backing up anymore on their way of doing and seeing things. Before they were trying to show up like sharing some western values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 79</td>
<td>Removes the two five-year terms limit on the Presidency and Vice Presidency</td>
<td>Removes the two five-year terms limit on the Presidency and Vice Presidency, which were first written into the Constitution in 1982. Constitutionally, the Presidency and Vice Presidency still remain largely ceremonial positions.</td>
<td>Great Power(?)</td>
<td>loyalty</td>
<td>chinese political system/western political system</td>
<td>China is integrating a global view on responsibility on climate. This might be seen as China accepting new responsibilities, ones of a more developed country. Development is having an stronger environmental legislation (?).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 89</td>
<td>&quot;to direct and administer economic affairs and urban and rural development&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;to direct and administer economic affairs and urban and rural development, as well as the building of an ecological civilization&quot;</td>
<td>Great Power(?)</td>
<td>loyalty</td>
<td>chinese political system/western political system</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Article 100</td>
<td>The people’s congresses of provinces, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, and their standing committees may adopt local regulations, which must not contravene the Constitution and other laws and administrative regulations, and they shall report such local regulations to the Standing Committee of the National</td>
<td>The people’s congresses of cities divided into districts and their standing committees may adopt local regulations in accordance with the provisions of law, provided that they do not contravene the Constitution, laws, administrative regulations, and the local regulations of the corresponding provinces or autonomous regions, and they shall take effect after being reported to and approved by the</td>
<td>Great Power(?)</td>
<td>loyalty</td>
<td>chinese political system/western political system</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Article 101</td>
<td>Local people’s congresses at or above the county level elect, and have the power to recall, presidents of people’s courts and chief procurators of people’s procuratorates at the corresponding level.</td>
<td>amended</td>
<td>Local people’s congresses at or above the county level elect, and have the power to recall, chairpersons of supervision commissions, presidents of people’s courts and chief procurators of people’s procuratorates at the corresponding level.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Article 103</td>
<td>No one on the standing committee of a local people’s congress at or above the county level shall hold office in State administrative, adjudicatory and procuratorial organs.</td>
<td>amended</td>
<td>No one on the standing committee of a local people’s congress at or above the county level shall hold office in State administrative, supervision, adjudicatory and procuratorial organs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Article 104</td>
<td>supervises the work of the people’s government, people’s court and people’s procuratorate at the corresponding level</td>
<td>amended</td>
<td>supervises the work of the people’s government, supervision commission, people’s court and people’s procuratorate at the corresponding level.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Article 107</td>
<td>Local people’s governments at or above the county level, within the limits of their authority as prescribed by law, conduct administrative work concerning the economy, education, science, culture, public health, physical culture, urban and rural development, finance, civil affairs, public security, nationalities affairs, judicial administration, supervision and family planning in their respective administrative areas; issue decisions and orders; appoint or remove administrative functionaries, train them, appraise their performance and reward or punish them.</td>
<td>amended</td>
<td>Local people’s governments at or above the county level, within the limits of their authority as prescribed by law, conduct administrative work concerning the economy, education, science, culture, public health, physical culture, urban and rural development, finance, civil affairs, public security, nationalities affairs, judicial administration and family planning in their respective administrative areas; issue decisions and orders; appoint or remove administrative functionaries, train them, appraise their performance and reward or punish them.</td>
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<td>//</td>
<td>Territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter three</td>
<td>A new section seventh is added</td>
<td></td>
<td>Section 7 The Supervision Commissions // Article 123: The supervision commissions of the People’s Republic of China at various levels are the supervision organs of the State. Article 124: The People’s Republic of China establishes the State Supervision Commission and local supervision commissions at various levels. A supervision commission is composed of the following: a Chairperson; several Vice</td>
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Chairpersons; and several members. The term of office of the Chairperson of a supervision commission is the same as that of the people’s congress at the same level. The Chairperson of the State Supervision Commission shall serve no more than two consecutive terms. The organization and functions and powers of the supervision commissions are prescribed by law. Article 125: The State Supervision Commission of the People’s Republic of China is the highest supervision organ. The State Supervision Commission directs the work of the supervision commissions at various local levels, and supervision commissions at higher levels direct the work of those at lower levels. Article 126: The State Supervision Commission is responsible to the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee. Supervision commissions at the various local levels are responsible to the organs of state power which created them and to the supervision commissions at higher levels. Article 127: The supervision commissions exercise supervision power independently, in accordance with the provisions of law, and not subject to interference by any administrative organ, public organization or individual. The supervision organs, in handling cases of illegal or criminal abuse of public office, shall mutually cooperate with and mutually restrict adjudicatory organs, procuratorial organs, and law enforcement departments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>pg</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Annotation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There had to be something wrong with my brother, I tought, to get his age and prefer guitars over woman.</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>I realized father was a man with quite a libido, just that he was born a bit before his time. In his day, libido wasn't called libido, it was called idealism.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Bodies</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>libido was idealistic. It shows a grown man who still is energetic. Is he trying to depict chinese man as full of energy or the contrary? Now people have more libido.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bodies wasn’t it normal to have energy?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>autobiographies</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy: it's a problem for the planet, it's a problem for us, both now and then in the future.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Bodies</td>
<td>People/territory</td>
<td>it is expressing a feeling of uncertainty around the resources given in the territory. A disconnection with territory?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadly, I didn't have that much money to squeander in the first place; maybe I've just been unlucky so far in my life. But one day I'm sure I'm going to make it big, great handfuls of bills will hit me in the face whenever I open my door; there'll be nowhere to hide. Dollars -- they have the intoxicating, exotic generosity of spirit. The way a dollar bill can generate endless renminbi out of thin air, it's like magic; down they float into your outstretched hands, your eyes raised heavenward, gratefully receiving this riot, this shower of fortune. Just give me a chance and I'd show the world exactly what kind of a carefree, rustless spending machine I could be. Then, after throwing it all away, just as my friends have predicted, I’d live out my later years in lonely poverty.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Affiliation</td>
<td></td>
<td>to the dollar and therefore what it represents... capitalism</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
So I thought better of it, thought I’d be betraying the years of friendship between Father and me. [...] But when I pictured my father or one of my good friends messing around with her, it felt like an outrage. I love my father.

As I might already have mentioned, I was unfortunate enough to have the sex sickness; they say it’s hereditary, but you can also catch it through contact. In any case, whenever I suffered a severe attack, my mouth and tongue would go dry and I’d start gibbering. On this count, I envied my father more than I could say: he must have had the sickness too, but he always kept a grip on himself; it was never chronic with him, the symptoms never any more intrusive than those of a common cold. I think I’ve got that about right. And that, precisely was the main reason I had it so badly.

I ought to understand what my father needs, I thought. A son shouldn’t shirk his filial duties. If, some distant day in the future, I should ever find myself at a loose end and free of the self-importance that comes with age, and run off to visit my son, I’d want him to figure out what was required, to be able to search out a few glimmers of fun for hishardworking father. I wouldn’t want to end up with some idiot who only knew how to offer a pious faceful of empty respect.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bodies</th>
<th>People</th>
<th>Loyalty. Chinese people are loyal.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Autobiographies (?)</td>
<td>he must have had the sickness too, but he always kept a grip on himself; it was never chronic with him, the symptoms never any more intrusive than those of a common cold. I think I’ve got that about right. And that, precisely was the main reason I had it so badly</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Father and I laughed. We started moving again, but still in silence. Near the overpass, a few women dressed in Miao minority costume walked up to us, peddling trinkets. Everyone knew they were phonys, but their outfits were so bright and unusual against the drab urban landscape, they were instantly forgiven.

As he walked along, Father was ranting about the situation in the Gulf. War, or talk about war, has always been a way of letting off libidinal steam.

"Listen, if you could just calm down a bit, you'd realize that we don't need nearly as many women as we think we want. Only a few, a very few." I don't know about that. All I know is I'm different. "No, no, think about it some more. You're not as unusual as you think, you've got it all blown out of proportion. Okay, you're younger than me, you're fitter, maybe you need more than me, but no way as many as you think. You just think it through."

"I want you to say exactly what you mean. Are you saying I'm dishonest? If you ask me, sex has messed with your head. Not everyone wants to screw every woman he sees, is always thinking about sex, sex, and nothing but. Everyone's different. According to you, wanting to screw every woman you see is being honest, and anything else dishonest. Nothing's ever that simple."

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<th>Bodies</th>
<th>People</th>
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<th>Role</th>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Autobiographies</th>
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<th>the new role of sex</th>
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<td>21</td>
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</table>
I objected, anyone can come out with them. But they're not enough to live on. We know sex isn't a bad or a good thing; all we know is we need it. If we're not getting any otherwise and it's being sold on the market, why shouldn't we go and buy some? As long as we're paying for the genuine article, at a fair price, into the shopping cart it goes, just like everything else; no need to waste any more mental energy on it.

But why am I bothering? he went on. Time will teach you this things. Surely you know me better than that, Dad, you must know I'm entertain you the best I can, I know it hasn't been easy for you, supporting your family all these years. I'm the eldest, I can see that better than anyone. If only I'd had more time to prepare: I'm not running an escort service here, I don't have an address book bulging with eligible phone numbers. You see for yourself how things are: I'm not rich. I can only do the best I can in difficult circumstances. Then there's the problem of your own preferences, which are a little, well, eccentric, should I say, in this day and age.

The father and the two sons went to university.

The market and the culture of money has made this young man dehumanize women and sex; it becomes one more merchandise.

Recalling the hard past, but reaffirming present is also hard.
Yes, he yearns for money; his blood jingles through his veins, mimicking the musical tinkle of gold; he's prepared to work, honestly, but he wants honest respect, and honest money, more and more of it, in return. Price is the only true gauge of honesty. 10,000 yuan per 1,000 words has to be better than 30: keep the dollars flying at him, and inspiration will never dry up; poverty is far more corrupting than money. I respect my forebears, but those long-suffering earlier generations of writers who weren't interested in money or in sleeping with more than a dozen women doomed themselves to mediocrity. The next generation was just as bad: though they got a taste of sweetness, of money and women, they were either too nervous or too pretentious to write anything decent about either. But the next generation, my generation, is different: greedy for everything, everywhere. smashing, grabbing swearing. Because they write for money, for women, everyone thinks they're going places.

That's what he said. The red taxi plowed down the busiest street of the city. Most stores hadn't yet shut for the night, encouraged, maybe even forced by the government to keep their doors open later and later. We're all businessmen now, and the world is turning into one enormous mall, it gets bigger every day. If this city of ours is going to make it into modernity, it needs nightlife, twinkling lights, glorious Technicolor, consumption, it needs you-yes, you-to abandon all sense of restraint and moderation, to drive these outdated concepts further and further from your mind, to fit into a future in which both will have been abolished, in which doomsday looms ever closer-closer and closer. Still looking forward to the future, are you? Better to be Father than me, me than my son, my son than my grandson. Whenever I see a baby, my heart fills with pity. Why so late, unlucky child?
I knew full well my tears were cheap, as were my emotions. I was a cheap person, in an age that burned to sell cheap, my natural habitat the clearance warehouse pushed carelessly to one end of a shelf, happy to write for anyone who tossed me a couple of coins. I was ready and waiting: I'd even put my soul on special, on 70, 80 percent discount. But don't forget: I want to be paid in dollars-fucking dollars.

"A writer ought to offer people something positive, something to look up to, ideals, aspirations, democracy, freedom, stuff like that"  "Dad, I'm telling you, all that stuff, it's all there in sex."

I hardly ever patronized this kind of establishment, though I knew there was fun to be had in them. For a very simple reason: I didn't have the money. It was only when rich friends found themselves in the mood for celebration that people like me got to see what went on inside.

I informed him, they can chat with you or dance with you or go home with you and screw you. They're businesswomen. engaged in business controlled. like we all are. by macroeconomic price regulationms.

"What are they all doing sitting there?" I didn't know whether Father really didn't know or was just pretending. They're waiting for customers. I informed him, they can chat with you or dance with you or go home with you and screw you.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bodies (people)/Roles/affiliations</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>33</td>
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<th></th>
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<tr>
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<th>Bodies (people(?))</th>
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It is like this idea that the past was great, that the present is pure decadence and that the great days are over. The father behaves as if he had never done anything wrong ... is it true? It is not known, what is known is that the eldest son does not think that the past has been much better than the present in which he lives; he does not remember the past as they want to paint it.
Put another way, half an hour of their labor was worth at least a month of mine. A bit unfair, perhaps? Or just another example of the unfair social division of labor: it happened all the time, no point in griping about it.

Such a small thing: if there'd been dollar and not yuan signs on the bills sitting in my pocket, I'd have been all right. In Chinese, dollars are called mei yuan: beautiful, good yuan, better versions of our flawed renminbi selves.

Father belonged to a generation that could completely negate their libido.

Expressing no sympathy for my predicament, the girls accepted my 50 yuan taxi money without any embarrassment and began discussing how to get back to the main road and find a ride home. And so they left. I couldn’t forgive them, even though I still had a kind of grudging respect for them. They lived according to one kind of principle; the problem was, I’d hoped against extravagant hope that they could have given the principle just a bit of heart.
<table>
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</table>
everything, everywhere. smashing, grabbing swearing. Because they write for money, for women, everyone thinks they're going places.

| 32 | That's what he said. The red taxi plowed down the busiest street of the city. Most stores hadn't yet shut for the night, encouraged, maybe even forced by the government to keep their doors open later and later. We're all businessmen now, and the world is turning into one enormous mall, it gets bigger every day. If this city of ours is going to make it into modernity, it needs nightlife, twinkling lights, glorious Technicolor, consumption, it needs you—yes, you—to abandon all sense of restraint and moderation, to drive these outmoded concepts further and further from your mind, to fit into a future in which both will have been abolished, in which doomsday looms ever closer-closer and closer. Still looking forward to the future, are you? Better to be Father than me, me than my son, my son than my grandson. Whenever I see a baby, my heart fills with pity. Why so late, unlucky child? |
| 37 | I informed him, they can chat with you or dance with you or go home with you and screw you. They’re businesswomen. engaged in business controlled. like we all are. by macroeconomic price regulations. |
| 41 | Expressing no sympathy for my predicament, the girls accepted my 50 yuan taxi money without any embarrassment and began discussing how to get back to the main road and find a ride home. And so they left. I couldn't forgive them, even though I still had a kind of grudging respect for them. They lived according to one kind of principle: the problem was, I'd hoped against extravagant hope that they could have given the principle just a bit of heart. |