Los afectos en la concepción de la justicia como equidad de John Rawls
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2020-06-19COAR
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Affects in John Rawls's conception of justice as fairnessResumen
En este trabajo rastreo la relación entre los afectos y la política en la obra de John Rawls. Muestro que la concepción de la justicia como equidad de Rawls no tiene el sesgo racionalista que le atribuyen algunos de sus críticos y que, por el contrario, los afectos son fundamentales en esta concepción. Para ello, respondo directamente a las críticas que plantea Sharon Krause (2008) en su libro Civil Passions: Moral Sentiment and Democratic Deliberation.
Abstract
In this work I trace the relationship between affects and politics in John Rawls's conception. I show that Rawls's conception of justice as fairness does not have a rationalist bias attributed to him by some of his critics. On the contrary, I emphasize that affects are fundamental in this conception of justice. I respond directly to the criticism that Sharon Krause (2008) states in her book Civil Passions: Moral Sentiment and Democratic Deliberation.
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- Maestría en Filosofía [251]
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