¿Es solipsista el realismo interno de Putnam?
| dc.contributor | null | |
| dc.contributor | null | |
| dc.contributor.author | Toro, Javier; Universitat de València | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-02-24T15:59:37Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-04-15T18:12:33Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-02-24T15:59:37Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-04-15T18:12:33Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2015-09-08 | |
| dc.description.abstract | En este ensayo sostengo que el reciente rechazo de Putnam de su primera doctrina del realismo interno como solipsista es un argumento fallido. Este rechazo viene ilustrado por la crítica de su propia explicación verificacionista de la verdad y la justificación, que se basa en el condicional contrafáctico: “S es verdadero si y solo si creer que S se justifica si las condiciones epistémicas son suficientemente buenas”. Al aceptar que lo que hace racional creer que S también hace racional creer que S se justifica si las condiciones son suficientemente buenas, Putnam concluye que el verificacionista inevitablemente oscila entre el solipsismo y el realismo metafísico. En oposición a esto, sostengo que la última crítica de Putnam a su propio realismo interno falla en reconocer el lado pragmático de su propuesta filosófica; a saber, la idea de que, sin importar la relación tan estrecha entre verdad y justificación, no todas las oraciones de un juego de lenguaje se deben entender de un modo verificacionista. En consecuencia, la comprensión del contrafáctico “S se justifica si las condiciones epistémicas son suficientemente buenas”, no exige una lectura verificacionista, la cual, como Putnam sostiene, conduce al solipsismo sino, más bien, da lugar a un acercamiento pragmático que enfatiza la no formalidad en la comprensión del lenguaje. | spa |
| dc.description.abstractenglish | In this essay I claim that Hilary Putnam’s recent rejection of his former doctrine of internal realism as solipsistic is a misfired claim. Putnam’s rejection of his early doctrine is illustrated by the criticism of his own verificationist account of truth and justification, which is based on the counterfactual conditional: “S is true if and only if believing S is justified if epistemic conditions are good enough”. By accepting that whatever makes it rational to believe that S also makes it rational to believe that S would be justified were conditions good enough, Putnam concludes that the verificationist unavoidably steers between solipsism and metaphysical realism. As opposed to this, I claim that Putnam’s later criticism of his own internal realism fails to acknowledge the pragmatic side of this philosophical approach; namely, the idea that, regardless the close relation between truth and justification, not all sentences in a language game are to be understood in a verificationist fashion. Thus, the understanding of the counterfactual “S would be justified if epistemic conditions were good enough” doesn’t call for a verificationist reading, which, as Putnam claims, yields solipsism, but rather, for a pragmatic approach which emphasizes on the non-formality of language understanding. | eng |
| dc.format | spa | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | spa |
| dc.identifier | http://revistas.javeriana.edu.co/index.php/vniphilosophica/article/view/13343 | |
| dc.identifier | 10.11144/Javeriana.uph32-64.pirs | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2346-2426 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0120-5323 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10554/31271 | |
| dc.language.iso | spa | |
| dc.publisher | Pontificia Universidad Javeriana | spa |
| dc.relation.citationissue | Universitas Philosophica; Vol. 32, Núm. 64 (2015); 267-282 | spa |
| dc.relation.uri | http://revistas.javeriana.edu.co/index.php/vniphilosophica/article/view/13343/10718 | |
| dc.rights | Copyright (c) 2015 Universitas Philosophica | spa |
| dc.rights.accessrights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.rights.coar | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | spa |
| dc.rights.licence | Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional | * |
| dc.subject | Putnam; realismo; pragmatismo; verdad; correspondencia | spa |
| dc.subject | Putnam; realism; pragmatism; truth; correspondence | eng |
| dc.title | ¿Es solipsista el realismo interno de Putnam? | spa |
| dc.title.english | Is Putnam’s Internal Realism Solipsistic? | eng |
| dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |
| dc.type.driver | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type.hasversion | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |
| dc.type.local | Artículo de revista | spa |